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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
CHRISTOPHER T. SHANAHAN, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CR-95-502 
MOTION TO CORRECT 
ILLEGAL SENTENCE 
COMES NOW the defendant, Christopher Shanahan, by and through his 
counsel Craig H. Durham, and moves this Court to correct his sentence of life in 
prison, with 35 years fixed, for first degree murder. Mr. Shanahan asserts that the 
United States Supreme Court has reinterpreted constitutional law as it pertains to 
juvenile sentencing, and his sentence now violates the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. He seeks a new sentencing hearing. 
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This motion is brought under the authority of Idaho Criminal Rule 35(a). 
It is supported by the files and records in this case, and Mr. Shanahan's 
memorandum in support and exhibits filed contemporaneously with the motion. 
DATED thisJ}_ day of June, 2017. 
Craig H. · urham 
A ttomey for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
;-
-
I hereby certify that on this _JJ_ day of June, 2017, I served a copy of this 
Motion on the following, by depositing a copy, postage prepaid, in the United 
States Mail, addressed to: 
Mr. Paul Butikofer 
Jefferson County Prosecuting Attorney 
PO Box 77 
Rigby ID 83442 
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FERGUSON DURHAM, PLLC 
223 N. 6th Street, Suite 325 
Boise, ID 83701 
chd@fergusondurham.com 
T: 208-345-5183, ext. 1000 
F: 208-906-8663 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
CHRISTOPHER T. SHANAHAN, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CR-95-502 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION TO CORRECT 
ILLEGAL SENTENCE 
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INTRODUCTION 
Christopher Shanahan was a  boy when he was taken into custody in 
1995 and charged with robbery and murder. Threatened with a possible death sentence, 
he eventually pied guilty to those charges. The Honorable Brent J. Moss sentenced him 
to a controlling term of life in prison with no possibility of parole for at least 35 years. 
Since then, the United States Supreme Court has dramatically altered the 
constitutional landscape for juvenile sentencing. That landscape looks nothing like it 
did in the mid-1990s. Children are not mini-adults, and we now know from scientific 
advancements in the study of brain development that a child's ability to make reasoned 
judgments is diminished, and a child's capacity for rehabilitative change is significantly 
greater than adult offenders. The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments therefore require 
courts to take the unique mitigating features of youth into account during a sentencing 
hearing. 
For the reasons that follow, Mr. Shanahan contends that he was deprived of the 
individualized consideration and weighing of factors that are unique to child offenders 
before he was sentenced to life in prison, with a parole consideration at the earliest 
when he is 50 years old. Accordingly, his sentence violates the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments of the United States Constitution. It is an illegal sentence, and he seeks 
relief in the form of a new sentencing hearing. 
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FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
This case involves the tragic murder of Mrs. Fidela Tomehak, a clerk at the Grant 
convenience store in Jefferson County, on the afternoon of November 10, 1995. (Tr., p. 
325, L. 12-13.) 
On that day, Rigby high school sophomores Christopher Shanahan, Benjamin 
("B.J.") Jenkins, and Thomas Lundquist drove to the store with the intent to rob it 
before heading for Las Vegas to start a new life. Fueled by movies, rap music, and 
tough talk, they only had the barest notion of how three adolescent boys from Rigby 
were going to survive long-term in Vegas. 
The boys were armed, having previously taken guns and ammunition from the 
home of B.J.'s family. (Tr., pp. 301-14.) After gassing up the car, B.J. and Chris walked 
into the store while Tom stayed outside. Mrs. Tomehak was stocking a beverage cooler. 
(Tr., p. 325, In. 6-7.) Chris came up behind her, raised his gun one time and lowered it 
because he couldn't shoot. (Tr., p. 325, In. 12-13.) He then brought it back up and fired 
one shot into the back of Mrs. Tomchak's head. (Tr., p. 325, In. 12-13.) He stole a little 
over $200 from the register and some cigarettes, and B.J. took beer out of a cooler. (Tr., 
p. 325, In. 18-19, p. 330, In. 17-21.) 
They then sped away to Las Vegas. (Tr., p. 332, In. 9-12.) They didn't last long; 
Chris got homesick, and the three boys were driving back through Utah when they 
were stopped and arrested. (Tr., p. 1138, In. 1-25, p. 1139, In. 1-6.) Chris confessed to law 
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enforcement officers, waived extradition, and came back to Idaho to face charges along 
with his two co-defendants. 
The State charged him with first degree murder, robbery, and the use of a 
firearm during the commission of an offense. (Clerk's Rec., pp. 1-2.) Because of the 
severity of the charges, he was automatically prosecuted as an adult. Idaho Code§ 20-
509(1 ). The charge of first degree murder carried a possible death sentence. Idaho Code 
§ 18-4004. Eventually, Chris's attorneys reached an agreement with the prosecution. In 
exchange for entering guilty pleas to first degree murder and robbery, and testifying for 
the State, the State agreed not to seek the death penalty, not to recommend a specific 
term of years, and to dismiss the weapons enhancement. This agreement was based on 
a false promise. The United States Supreme Court had already held that the Eighth 
Amendment prohibited capital punishment against children who committed their 
crimes under the age of 16. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815,838 (1988). The threat of 
a ieath sentence, then, was an illusory but powerful one for a teenager. This seemed to 
slip the notice of all parties, including the judge. 
Before sentencing, Chris's counsel filed a motion for a sentencing hearing under 
the Juvenile Corrections Act. The trial court denied that motion. It then held an 
aggravation and mitigation hearing, as required in death-penalty eligible cases. At the 
outset, the court noted that it did not think that a death sentence "would be an 
appropriate penalty" due to Chris's age. (Tr., p. 907, In. 17-18.) 
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At the hearing, Chris's counsel presented the testimony of two mental health 
experts, who testified about his psychological profile, which included significant 
immaturity for his age, struggles from his parent's divorce and his father's emotional 
absence, and his peer influences and desire to impress Tom. 
The court later issued written Findings of the Court and Imposition of Sentence, 
also as required by cases potentially subject to a death sentence. Idaho Code§ 19-2515. 
The court noted that it had "focused primarily on the age of the defendant in 
determining the death penalty was not an appropriate sentencing option," and that its 
opinion remained unchanged. (Clerk's R., p. 190.) The only findings related specifically 
to Chris's youth were under a four-sentence analysis of "rehabilitation," where the 
court wrote that due to Chris's young age "there is hope that he may eventually become 
a contributing member of society." (Id. at 191.) 
In contrast, in the "deterrence" section, the court noted that "murders continue in 
our society and, alarmingly, they are all too often committed by teenagers." (Id.) The 
court concluded that "[t]he defendant's actions require a severe punishment even 
considering his age." (Id. at 192.) It sentenced him to life in prison for both murder and 
robbery, concurrent, with 35 years fixed for murder and 10 years fixed for robbery. (Id. 
at 193.) A motion to reduce these sentences was denied. 
Chris's counsel appealed to the Idaho Court of Appeals. The appeal was 
unsuccessful. The Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court did not abuse its 
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discretion in denying the motion for sentencing under the Juvenile Corrections Act. 
State v. Shanahan, 133 Idaho 896,899.994 P.2d 1059, 1062 (1999). Then the Court of 
Appeals found that the sentence was not "out of proportion" to the offense and it 
declined further analysis on a claim under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause 
of the Eight Amendment. 133 Idaho at 900, 994 P.2d at 1063. It also turned aside an 
argument that the sentence was excessive for similar reasons. 133 Idaho at 902, 994 P.2d 
at 1065. 
Chris Shanahan has served 22 years in prison. He is now a  man. Both 
of his co-defendants have been paroled. He has never filed a petition for post-conviction 
relief or any other motion seeking collateral relief in state or federal court. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
ON THE FACE OF THE RECORD, CHRISTOPHER SHANAHAN'S LIFE SENTENCE FOR MURDER, 
WITH 35 YEARS FIXED, VIOLA TES THE EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS BECAUSE THE 
TRIAL COURT SENTENCED MR. SHANAHAN, THEN A CHILD, AS AN ADULT WITHOUT FIRST 
ADEQUATELY CONSIDERING AND WEIGHING THE MITIGATING QUALITIES OF YOUTH. 
A. The issue is properly before the Court. 
Although Mr. Shanahan brings his motion more than 20 years after he was 
sentenced, this Court has jurisdiction to reach the merits. 
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There is no time limit for considering a motion to correct an illegal sentence 
under Idaho Criminal Rule 35(a), which provides that, "[t]he court may correct a 
sentence that is illegal from the face of the record at any time." Id. An illegal sentence is 
one that is "in excess of a statutory provision or otherwise contrary to applicable law." 
State v. Alsanea, 138 Idaho 733, 745, 69 P.3d 153, 165 (Idaho Ct. App. 2003). The Idaho 
Supreme Court has recently clarified that a court has the authority under Rule 35 to 
correct an illegal sentence "[that] does not involve significant questions of fact or 
require an evidentiary hearing." State v. Clements, 148 Idaho 82, 85, 218 P.3d 1143, 1146 
(Idaho 2009). Rule 35 "applies to a narrow category of cases in which the sentence 
imposes a penalty that is simply not authorized by law or where new evidence tends to 
show that the original sentence was excessive." 148 Idaho 82, 86, 218 P.3d 1143, 1147. 
Here, Mr. Shanahan raises no significant questions of fact nor seeks an 
evidentiary hearing. He asserts that his sentence is now illegal due to a fundamental 
change in the law since his 1997 sentencing hearing that has redefined the application of 
the Eighth Amendment as it pertains to juvenile sentencing. This Court can safely move 
to the merits of that claim to determine whether the sentence is illegal. See Johnson v. 
State, Slip Op. 42857, at 15 (Idaho Supreme Court, May 12, 2017) (characterizing a claim 
based on a fundamental change in Eighth Amendment law as to juvenile sentencing as 
one alleging a potential "illegal sentence"). 
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B. For any child who faces a potential sentence of life in prison without 
parole, the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require sentencing courts 
to first consider and give weight to the mitigating qualities of youth. 
Mr. Shanahan was convicted and sentenced at the peak of an era in which the 
criminal justice system treated adolescents who committed "adult" crimes just like 
adults. Idaho was no different. See, e.g., Idaho Code 20-509(3) Guveniles convicted in 
adult court are thereafter handled in "every respect" as an adult). In the mid-1990s, 
states were rapidly enacting laws to move more and younger kids in to adult court and 
to impose much more severe punishments on them. In 1996, no less a public figure than 
Hillary Clinton described a generation of juvenile "super predators" who lack any 
empathy or remorse. See, "1996: Hillary Clinton on '"superpredators,"' Youtube at 
https://goo.gl/AlsgMA. This sentiment was reflected in law. 
In the ensuing years, however, the United States Supreme Court has worked a 
revolution in the Eighth Amendment's application to juvenile sentencing. 
(1) Children are constitutionally different than adults. 
Though the seeds of this jurisprudence were planted a decade or so before, they 
did not begin to ripen until 2005 in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569-70 (2005). There, 
the Court held that the diminished culpability of children rendered the death penalty 
unconstitutionally disproportionate for youth as a class. 543 U.S. at 571. The Court 
based its decision on key differences between youth and adults, including a '"lack of 
maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility,"' which frequently leads to 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO CORRECT ILLEGAL SENTENCE - 7 
16     04/09/2018
"'impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions'"; an increased susceptibility to 
"negative influences and outside pressures" with a reduced ability to control or escape 
their environments; and a "more transitory, less fixed" character that is "not as well 
formed as that of an adult." Id. at 569-70 (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350,367 
(1993)). 
The Court next applied the same reasoning to strike down sentences of life 
without parole for non-homicide crimes. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 76 (2010). 
Relying on advances in scientific knowledge showing that an adolescent's brain does 
not fully develop until his mid-twenties, the Court held that, "[a]n offender's age is 
relevant to the Eighth Amendment, and [so] criminal procedure laws that fail to take 
defendants' youthfulness into account at all would be flawed." Id. at 76. The Court 
declared that states must "give defendants like Graham some meaningful opportunity 
to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation." Id. at 75. 
Two years later, in Miller v. Alabama, the Court took another step, holding that 
mandatory sentences of life without parole for juveniles who have committed homicide 
offenses also violates the Eighth Amendment. Miller, 567 U.S. _J 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012). 
In reaching that conclusion, the Court echoed the principles it had outlined in Roper and 
Graham, noting that "children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of 
sentencing" and they "have diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform." 
132 S.Ct. at 2464. It determined that sentencing courts must consider and give effect to 
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the mitigating qualities of youth, listing several factors that make up these unique 
qualities (the "Miller factors"): 
• Impulsivity, recklessness, and the failure to appreciate risks and 
consequences; 
• Family and home environment; 
• The outsized impact of negative peer influences and pressures; 
• An inability to deal with police officers or prosecutors (including in plea 
negotiations), or the incapacity to assist defense attorneys, meaning that 
the juvenile might have faced a lesser offense; and 
• An ability to change as the child matures into adulthood. 
132 S.Ct., at 2467-68. The Court stressed that, given these factors, it is only the "rare 
juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption" that should stay in prison 
for life. Miller, 132 S.Ct. at 2469. 
Miller is retroactive to cases that were final before it was decided. Montgomery v. 
Louisiana,_ U.S.__, 136 S.Ct. 718, 734 (2016). Specifically, the Court held that, "[i]n 
light of what this Court has said in Roper, Graham, and Miller ... [juvenile lifers] must be 
given the opportunity to show their crime did not reflect irreparable corruption; and, if 
it did not, their hope for some years of life outside prison walls must be restored." Id. 
(2) The rule applies to any child who faces a life sentence. 
The State might choose to argue that Mr. Shanahan's case falls outside of Miller 
and Montgomery because he did not receive a mandatory sentence of life in prison 
without the possibility of parole. It is true that he is eligible for parole consideration 
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after serving 35 years, but other jurisdictions have turned aside such arguments in 
persuasive opinions. 
For instance, in State v. Zuber, 152 A.3d 197 (N.J. 2017), the New Jersey Supreme 
Court held that sentences that are the functional equivalent to life sentences, even if 
parole is technically available in old age, are unconstitutional in the absence of 
consideration of the Miller mitigating factors. Id. at 213 ("judges must evaluate the Miller 
factors when they sentence a juvenile to a lengthy period of parole ineligibility"); see also 
State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41, 71-73 (Iowa 2013) (applying Miller to reverse a sentence 
that allowed parole eligibility at age 69). 
The Washington Supreme Court has applied these same principles to even 
shorter prison terms. State v. Houston-Sconiers, 391 P.3d 409 (Wash. March 2, 2017). In 
Houston-Sconiers, the two defendants were sentenced on several counts of robbery to 
terms of 26 and 31 years of "flat time," meaning that they must serve at least that 
amount of time before release. Id. at 415-16. Like Mr. Shanahan, those defendants would 
first be eligible for parole later in middle age. Nevertheless, the Washington Supreme 
Court reversed the sentences and held that Graham and Miller required the trial court to 
account for the defendants' youth before sentencing them to such lengthy terms. Id. at 
420-21. 
A recent federal case, Malvo v. Mathena, Case No. 2017 WL 2462188 (E. D. Va. 
May 26, 2017), is also instructive. There, one of the notorious "DC Snipers," Lee Boyd 
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Malvo, serving fixed life, was granted a new sentencing hearing on federal habeas 
review because the state court had not considered his youth in a constitutionally 
appropriate manner. The federal court first held that the Eighth Amendment rule 
applies to all sentencing schemes that result in fixed life, regardless whether they are 
discretionary or mandatory. Id. at 5-6. The court also stressed that a Miller hearing is 
required for all juveniles "facing" a sentence of life in prison without parole. Id. at 5 
("[t]his, then, is the purpose of the Miller rule: to evaluate all juveniles facing life 
imprisonment without parole and sort out which ones are irreparably corrupted and 
which are not.") Malva thus reaffirms that the Miller rule includes both a substantive 
component - a life sentence without parole for a child, regardless whether the sentence 
is mandatory or discretionary, is disproportionately cruel and unusual without weighty 
evidence of permanent incorrigibility - and a procedural component to reduce the risk 
of such a disproportionate sentence - that is, the requirement of a Miller hearing for any 
child facing a potential lifetime in prison. 
Accordingly, Roper, Graham, Miller, and Montgomery lead in a straight line to the 
conclusion that juveniles who face the possibility of a lifetime in prison are a 
constitutionally distinct class, and must be treated differently than adults, for purposes 
of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Constitution requires that sentencing 
courts consider and give mitigating weight to the "Miller factors" at a sentencing 
hearing when life without parole is an option. That did not happen here. 
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C. Christopher Shanahan was prosecuted and sentenced in all respects as an 
adult and was deprived of the individualized consideration, and adequate 
weighing, of the mitigating qualities of youth. 
Mr. Shanahan was automatically prosecuted as an adult because of the nature of 
these charges. Idaho Code§ 20-509(1). He spent nearly two years locked in an adult 
county jail, as required by Idaho law. See Idaho Code§ 20-509(2). Idaho law further 
demands that once a juvenile is convicted of an offense in adult court, he be must 
"handled in every respect as an adult." Idaho Code§ 20-509(3). There was, and still is, a 
presumption that the trial court must apply adult sentencing measures unless it finds 
that they would be "inappropriate." Idaho Code§ 20-509(4). This case proceeded 
directly down the same path it would have if Chris Shanahan were an adult, right to an 
aggravation and mitigation hearing that was mandated by the theoretical possibility of 
the death penalty. 
At that hearing, Mr. Shanahan's counsel presented evidence from mental health 
experts. Dr. Peter Heinbecker testified that Mr. Shanahan was immature, impulsive, and 
that he was a follower and wanted to impress Tom Lundquist. (Tr., pp. 1123-30.) Dr. 
Casper testified that he had treated Mr. Shanahan, who was struggling to deal with an 
unpredictable role model in his father, for depression and that this crime was 
completely out of character for him. (Tr., pp. 996-1004.) Dr. Heinbecker added that Mr. 
Shanahan likely did not understand the impact that it had on the victim's family and 
the community. (Tr., p. 1146.) He testified that Mr. Shanahan had a good chance to be 
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rehabilitated and could be a productive member of society. (Tr., p. 1145.) This mental 
health testimony foreshadows precisely what the science would later prove to be true 
about adolescent brain development and culpability of juvenile offenders. 
But it was not treated in that way. Instead, in 1997, Idaho law required the trial 
court to treat Chris Shanahan as an adult offender in all respects. The trial court viewed 
this testimony as a description of him vis-a-vis other adult offenders who committed 
murder rather than giving it significant weight as showing the transitory attributes of 
youth. The trial court looked at the evidence more as an uncertain curiosity on which it 
couldn't depend and that paled in comparison to the seemingly inexplicable nature of 
this crime. (Clerk's Rec., pp. 188-191.) It made no finding of permanent incorrigibility. 
Mr. Shanahan was not afforded the right to a constitutionally adequate Miller hearing at 
which the attributes of youth were considered and given mitigating weight, as required 
by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
It is true that he previously raised an Eighth Amendment issue on direct appeal, 
see State v. Shanahan, 133 Idaho 896, 994 P.2d 1059 (1999), but the Idaho Court of 
Appeals focused on the facts of the crime and not on any characteristics of juvenile 
offenders as a class, or even on Mr. Shanahan as an individual. 133 Idaho at 900,994 
P.2d at 1063. This Eighth Amendment claim is a new one, based on a significant change 
in the law that has since rendered his sentence illegal. The Court is free to review it. See, 
e.g., Johnson v. State, Slip Op. 42857, at 15 (Idaho Supreme Court, May 12, 2017) 
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(reaching the merits of a claim based on a fundamental change in Eighth Amendment 
law as to juvenile sentencing). 
The Idaho Supreme Court recently addressed Miller and Montgomery in Johnson, 
and determined that the defendant there was not entitled to relief. But that case is 
distinguishable. 
Sarah Johnson, who was 16 years old when she was charged with murdering her 
parents, received two fixed life sentences. Johnson, Slip Op. at 1-2. In a successive post-
conviction appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court rejected her argument on the merits that 
her sentences were illegal under Miller. Id. at 16-17. Mental health experts had testified 
at the 2005 sentencing hearing specifically "about the developmental state of an 
adolescent's brain compared to an adult and how youth are more prone to impulsivity 
and more likely to be able to be rehabilitated." Id. at 17. The Idaho Supreme Court 
found that the trial court "clearly considered Johnson's youth and all its attendant 
characteristics and determined, in light of the heinous nature of the crime, that Johnson, 
despite her youth, deserved life without parole." Id. at 17-18. 
Here, in contrast, the district court did not entertain or give weight to the 
"attendant characteristics of youth" in the same constitutionally significant way. While 
Mr. Shanahan' s attorneys presented mental health testimony, the trial court did not 
view the evidence through the lens of the more advanced science showing juveniles as a 
class are less culpable and more adaptable to change than adults. Nor did it filter the 
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evidence through the more recent law that has established those as significant 
mitigating qualities. Sarah Johnson's sentencing hearing was held several months in the 
same year after Roper came down, which was the dawn of a different era for juvenile 
sentencing. It might as well have been light years from Mr. Shanahan's hearing in the 
1990s. 
Johnson is important to this case for other reasons, however. First, if there is any 
remaining doubt about whether this type of claim can be brought as one alleging an 
illegal sentence, the Idaho Supreme Court laid that doubt to rest in Johnson. It found that 
"she could not have made the claim that her sentence was illegal under Miller's holding 
interpreting the Eighth Amendment until after Miller was decided." Id. at 15 (emphasis 
in original). Next, the Idaho Supreme Court found that Miller and Montgomery require 
the trial court to hold a hearing specifically to consider the Miller factors. Id. at 17. That 
had already happened in Johnson; it did not happen here. 
D. Parole eligibility after 35 years does not fix the violation. 
In Montgomery, the Supreme Court held that the Miller rule was retroactive to 
prisoners who had been sentenced before Miller was decided, but noted that this did 
not require the States to relitigate sentences in every case. Montgomery, 136 S.Ct. at 736. 
Instead, a state "may remedy a Miller violation by permitting juvenile homicide 
offenders to be considered for parole, rather than by resentencing them." Id. 
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To comply with the Eighth Amendment, however, a state would need to channel 
parole commissioners' discretion and require them to consider the Miller factors. Idaho 
has not enacted any special parole consideration or procedures for juvenile lifers in 
response to Miller. Its current regulations focus on the facts of the crime, rehabilitation, 
and risk to the community, but do not contain specific guidelines requiring assessing 
and applying any mitigating weight for juvenile characteristics. IDAPA 50.01.01.250. 
The Commission has complete discretion to ignore those factors altogether. A long line 
of cases in Idaho, moreover, has held that there is no liberty interest in parole and that 
due process does not apply to parole hearings. See, e.g., Hays v. Craven, 131 Idaho 761, 
764,963 P.2d 1198, 1201 (Ct. App. 1998). There is a high and unacceptable risk that Mr. 
Shanahan will remain in prison for the rest of his natural life without any entity with 
the authority to release him holding a constitutionally-required Miller hearing. 
What is more, Mr. Shanahan is not even eligible for consideration of release until 
he i5 over 50 years old. As the courts of New Jersey, Washington, and Iowa, to name a 
few, have already wisely acknowledged, the possibility of a few years out of prison in 
late middle or old age in a best-case scenario is insufficient to save a sentence from an 
Eighth Amendment violation. This is a sentence of life in prison during one's most 
productive years. The prescient dissenting judge in the Washington Court of Appeals, 
later vindicated by the Washington Supreme Court, noted the logical force of this 
argument: 
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The loss of those years is as irrevocable and as potentially deadening as is 
the loss of the remaining years in a life sentence. The forfeiture is of similar 
quality as that at stake in Miller. 
State v. Houston-Sconiers, 365 P.3d 177, 194-95 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015) (Bjorgen, J., 
dissenting), majority overruled by State v. Houston-Sconiers, Slip Op. No. No. 92605-1 
(Wash. March 2, 2017). 
For these reasons, the passage of 35 years before even being eligible for review 
under Idaho's deficient parole scheme for an offense committed as a  is a 
disproportionate punishment under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
II. 
MR. SHANAHAN IS REHABILITATED, AND NEW EVIDENCE PROVES THE TRUTH OF ROPER, 
GRAHAM, MILLER, AND MONTGOMERYS BEDROCK PRINCIPLE - THAT CHILDREN WHO 
COMMIT EVEN HEINOUS CRIMES ARE CAP ABLE OF CHANGE. 
This Court can decide the legality of Mr. Shanahan' s sentence solely from the 
face of the established record, and it need go no further, entirely consistent with State v. 
Cl.::ments, 148 Idaho 82, 86, 218 P.3d 1143, 1147 (Idaho 2009). Clements also noted that 
Rule 35 applies to "cases in which the sentence imposes a penalty that is simply not 
authorized by law or where new evidence tends to show that the original sentence was 
excessive." Id. (emphasis added). It is unclear whether Clements invites the submission of 
new evidence with a motion to correct an illegal sentence. Mr. Shanahan believes that it 
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does, and he offers affidavits and sworn declarations showing the significant change in 
his character that has occurred over the last two-plus decades. 
The change has been nothing short of transformational. Because he was a 
reckless and impulsive teenager, the district court cited his lack of any conception of the 
consequences of this horrific crime. As a mature adult, he now understands fully the 
pain that his actions caused. He has sincere feelings of remorse, accountability, and 
responsibility. (Exhibit B to Motion, Affidavit of Christopher Shanahan, at 'i['i[ 4-5.) 
He is universally well-liked by prison staff and regarded as an unusually 
respectful, helpful, and cooperative inmate. (Exhibit C, Affidavit of Lynn Shanahan, at 'i[ 
9.) He has had only one disciplinary offense report in the last eighteen years. (Chris 
Shanahan Aff., at 'i[ 8.) He has completed numerous voluntary classes within the 
institution. (Id. at 'i['i[ 11-12.) He has been a long-time dog trainer for the Idaho Humane 
Society, and he is involved with the successful prison debate club sponsored by the 
nationally recognized Boise State Talking Broncos. (Id. at 'i[ 9.) He seeks to volunteer and 
give back by tutoring others within the institution. (Lynn Shanahan Aff. at 'i[ 8.) 
His family and friends attest to the change. His step-mother, Lynn, notes that he 
"certainly isn't the young  kid that was dealing with peer pressure, a broken 
home environment, and the underdeveloped mind of an adolescent that was not taught 
the meaning of consequences or having very little adult supervision." (Lynn Shanahan 
Aff., at 'i[ 5.) His sister writes that "he has been raised in the prison environment, which 
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is significant to recognize knowing the incredible person he is." (Exhibit F, Declaration 
of Meagan Meter, at <JI 7.) She further writes that "he is who he is IN SPITE of his 
environment." (Id.) She notes that she now considers him a role model for her sons 
because of the adversity that he has faced and the change that he has worked in the face 
of that adversity. (Id. at <JI 9.) 
Mr. Shanahan' s father, with whom he had a strained relationship in adolescence, 
states that Chris "was a child with a child's mentality [who] made a very poor choice 
and has paid a very severe price and by his own admission should have." (Exhibit D, 
Affidavit of David Shanahan, at <JI 14.) But today "Chris is a poster child of someone 
who if given a second chance has a real chance to become a productive and contributing 
member of our society." (Id.) 
The Court can review the affidavits and see for itself the change. 
III. 
JUVENILES CURRENTLY SERVING LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE IN IDAHO AND ACROSS THE 
COUNTRY WILL RECEIVE THE BENEFIT OF MILLER REVIEW. DEPRIVING MR. SHANAHAN OF 
THAT SAME BENEFIT VIOLATES THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT'S EQUAL PROTECTIO~ 
CLAUSE. 
The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits any state from depriving "any person 
within its jurisdiction of equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const. Amend. XIV. State 
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classifications that target a suspect class or that burden a fundamental right are subject 
to strict scrutiny. E.g., Honolulu Weekly, Inc., v. Harris, 298 F.3d 1037, 1047 (9th Cir. 2002). 
Mr. Shanahan contends that the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on states 
imposing sentences on juveniles for which there is a high likelihood that the juvenile 
will die in prison, without first holding a Miller hearing, is a fundamental right. It 
directly implicates both personal liberty and access to the courts. 
Other juveniles who received sentences of life without the possibility of parole 
for egregious and aggravated crimes will now get consideration under Miller and 
Montgomery. They could have their sentences reduced, or have a parole hearing after a 
shorter period than Mr. Shanahan. Wyoming is one example, which allows for parole 
review after 25 years. Wyo. Stat. Ann.§ 6-10-301(c) (2013). California is another. Cal. 
Pen. Code§ 1170(d)(2) (2012) (allowing juvenile lifers to petition for new sentence after 
15 years). 
There is no compelling governmental interest in treating a prisoner who has a 
fixed life sentence more favorably under law than one who is serving a 35 to life 
sentence. Absent that interest, or narrow tailoring, the failure to extend the benefit of a 
new sentencing hearing to Mr. Shanahan at which the Miller factors are weighed 
violates his right to equal protection of the law. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Shanahan is serving an illegal sentence for murder. This Court should vacate 
his judgment as to that offense and hold a new sentencing hearing at which he may 
present evidence and the Court must consider the mitigating factors of youth before 
imposing sentence. 
Respectfully submitted on this ~ay of June, 2017. 
Attorney for Christopher Shanahan 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
)-," 
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I hereby certify that on this .sl1..._ day of June, 2017, I served a copy of this 
Memorandum on the following, by depositing a copy, postage prepaid, in the United 
States Mail, addressed to: 
Mr. Paul Butikofer 
Jefferson County Prosecuting Attorney 
PO Box 77 
Rigby ID 83442 
C 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO CORRECT ILLEGAL SENTENCE - 22 
31     04/09/2018
EXHIBIT A 
To Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence 
Declaration of Craig H. Durhan1 
32     04/09/2018
Attachment l to Durham D ' . 
ec,arat,on 
Clerk's Record and r, . 
ranscr,pt 
State "· Shanahan, CR-9s-so2 
33     04/09/2018
Craig H. Durham 
ISB No. 6428 
FERGUSON DURHAM, PLLC 
223 N. 6th Street, Suite 325 
Boise, ID 83701 
chd@fergusondurham.com 
T: 208-345-5183, ext. 1000 
F: 208-906-8663 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
CHRISTOPHER T. SHANAHAN, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CR-95-502 
DECLARATION OF CRAIG H. 
DURHAM 
I, Craig H. Durham, declare under penalty of perjury: 
1. I am over the age of 18 and competent to testify. 
2. I am Chris Shanahan' s attorney. I base these statements on my personal 
knowledge. 
3. Attached to this Declaration for the Court's convenience on disk, labeled 
Attachment 1, is a true and correct copy of the Clerk's Record and the Transcripts in this 
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case that were presented as the Record on Appeal in Idaho Supreme Court Case No. 
23965, State v. Christopher Shanahan. 
4. Attached to this Declaration as Attachment 2, is a true and correct copy of 
the Idaho Court of Appeals' opinion in Case No. 23965. 
Under Idaho Code § 9-1406, I declare under penalty of perjury pursuant to the 
laws of the State of Idaho that the foregoing is true and correct. 
,t,.-
EXECUTED on this 2{t day of June, 2017. 
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ST A TE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
Christopher T. SHANAHAN, Defendant-Appellant. 
No. 23965. 
Court of Appeals ofldaho. 
December 1, 1999. 
Rehearing Denied Jan. 3, 2000. 
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Robert L. Crowley, Jr., Rigby, for appellant. 
Hon. Alan G. Lance, Attorney General; Alison A. Stieglitz, 
Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Alison A. 
Stieglitz argued. 
PERRY, Chief Judge. 
Christopher T. Shanahan appeals from the judgments of 
conviction and concurrent unified life sentences, with 
thirty-five years fixed, for first degree murder, I.C. § 
I 8-8003(a), and ten years fixed for robbery, I.C. § 18-6501. 
Shanahan also appeals from the denial of his I.C.R. 35 
motion. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm. 
I. 
BACKGROUND 
According to Shanahan's testimony at the trial of one of his 
co-defendants, Thomas P. Lundquist, Shanahan had spoken 
often of his desire to join a gang and believed that one way 
to become a member of a gang was to shoot someone. At a 
party on the evening of 
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November 9, 1995, Shanahan discussed with several of his 
friends his plan to run away to Las Vegas, Nevada, and join 
a gang. Shanahan also shared his plan to rob the Grant store 
and, if necessary, shoot the clerk. In an effort to dissuade 
Shanahan from his proposed course of action, his friends 
offered Shanahan money for his trip to Las Vegas. 
However, Shanahan refused their offer. 
The next day, Shanahan, Lundquist and Benjamin Jenkins 
agreed to run away to Las Vegas. In preparing for that trip, 
Jenkins and Shanahan obtained three guns from Jenkins' 
home. The weapons included a double-barrel shotgun, a 
single-barrel shotgun and a .22 caliber rifle. After retrieving 
the weapons from Jenkins' home, the three proceeded to 
Lundquist's residence. At Lundquist's home, ammunition 
for the weapons was procured, and Shanahan obtained 
gloves and two gasoline cans. 
Also at Lundquist's residence, Shanahan and Jenkins sawed 
off the barrels and the stocks of the guns. The weapons 
were test fired after they were altered. One of the shotguns 
failed to operate properly. Therefore, after leaving the 
Lundquist residence, the three individuals went back to 
Jenkins' home where Shanahan and Jenkins obtained 
another weapon. Shanahan then drove the three in his car to 
the Grant store. Shanahan testified that all three individuals 
participated in a discussion regarding the robbery of the 
store, what each person's role would be, and the possible 
shooting of the clerk. Shanahan agreed that he would enter 
the store and shoot the clerk. 
After waiting for a delivery person to leave, Shanahan 
drove to the fuel pumps located at the store. After filling the 
car and two gas cans and waiting for another individual to 
leave, Shanahan signaled to Jenkins that he should to go 
into the store. Jenkins entered the store. Shanahan put on 
the gloves, so as not to leave fingerprints at the scene, 
picked up the .22 caliber sawed-off rifle, and entered the 
store. Shanahan moved down the aisle behind where the 
store clerk, Fidela Tomehak, was working. Shanahan stood 
behind Tomehak, lifted the gun, hesitated for a minute, then 
raised the gun again and fired, killing Tomehak. Shanahan 
went around to where the victim lay, looked at her, and then 
checked the store for other witnesses. Finding none, 
Shanahan went to the cash register, put the murder weapon 
on the counter, removed cash and cigarettes, and ran out of 
the store. Realizing that he left the murder weapon inside 
the store, however, Shanahan returned to the store to 
retrieve the rifle. After again leaving the store, Shanahan 
got into his car and the three individuals left the scene, 
dliving to Las Vegas. 
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Eventually, all three individuals were apprehended. 
Shanahan was charged with first degree murder and 
robbery. [I] Claiming that Shanahan had used a firearm in 
the commission of the crimes, the state alleged a sentencing 
enhancement. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Shanahan pied 
guilty to first degree murder and robbery, and the state 
dismissed the firearm enhancement. According to 
Shanahan's testimony, under the terms of the plea 
agreement, the state agreed not to pursue the death penalty 
and agreed to recommend that Shanahan receive concurrent 
sentences. After pleading guilty, Shanahan filed a motion 
requesting that he be sentenced pursuant to the Juvenile 
Corrections Act. The district court denied the motion. A 
presentence investigation report was prepared and 
testimony was presented at a sentencing hearing. The 
district court issued extensive findings of fact and sentenced 
Shanahan to concurrent unified life terms, with thirty-five 
years fixed for first degree murder and ten years fixed for 
robbery. Shanahan filed an I.C.R. 35 motion for reduction 




A. Juvenile Corrections Act 
After entering his guilty pleas, Shanahan filed a motion 
requesting that he be sentenced as a juvenile pursuant to the 
Juvenile 
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Corrections Act. He asserted that adult sentencing would 
be inappropriate considering his age, vulnerability and best 
interests. The district court denied the motion. Shanahan 
argues that the district court abused its discretion when it 
denied his motion. 
Idaho Code Section 20-509(4) states: 
The sentencing judge of any juvenile convicted pursuant to 
this section may choose to sentence the convicted person in 
accordance with the juvenile sentencing options set forth in 
this act, if a finding is made that adult sentencing measures 
would be inappropriate. 
Shanahan asserts that the district court failed to give proper 
weight to his age, lack of maturity, life circumstances, and 
depression when it made the decision to sentence him as an 
adult. However, in order to sentence Shanahan as a 
juvenile, the district court was required to make a specific 
finding, not that sentencing Shanahan as a juvenile would 
be more appropriate but, that "adult sentencing measures 
--
would be inappropriate. " LC. § 20-509(4) (emphasis 
added). 
In denying Shanahan's motion, the district court stated that 
it did not believe that sentencing Shanahan as a juvenile 
was appropriate or in Shanahan's best interests. Specifically, 
the district court commented that Shanahan "could not 
receive the proper type of incarceration ... for the crime that 
has occurred." Shanahan renewed his motion during the 
Rule 35 hearing, and the district court reconsidered its 
decision. After an extensive colloquy between the district 
court and Shanahan's counsel, the district court determined 
that sentencing Shanahan as a juvenile was "simply not a 
viable option under the circumstances of this case unless [it] 
were looking only at the rehabilitation and disregarding 
completely the other sentencing factors." The district court 
also noted that pursuant to the Juvenile Corrections Act, a 
four-year sentence was the maximum it could impose. See 
I.C. 20-520(q). The district court found such a sentence 
inappropriate for the crimes committed in this case. 
Thus, based on the record before it, this Court cannot say 
the district court abused its discretion when it denied 
Shanahan's motion to be sentenced as a juvenile. 
B. Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
Shanahan next contends that the concurrent unified life 
sentences, with thirty-five years fixed for first degree 
murder and ten years fixed for robbery, constitute cruel and 
unusual punishment. Therefore, he argues that the sentences 
violate both the United States Constitution and the Idaho 
Constitution. 
When reviewing whether a sentence imposed under the 
Uniform Sentencing Act constitutes cruel and unusual 
punishment, this Court treats the minimum period of 
incarceration as the duration of confinement. State v. 
Matteson, 123 Idaho 622, 626, 851 P.2d 336, 340 (1993); 
State v. Daniel, 127 Idaho 801, 804, 907 P.2d 119, 122 
(Ct.App.1995). Therefore, the Court will analyze only 
whether the fixed portion--thirty-five years--of Shanahan's 
concurrent sentences violates the state and federal 
constitutions. 
The Idaho Supreme Court, in State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 
385, 825 P.2d 482 (1992), recognized the proportionality 
test under the Eighth Amendment, as dictated by Solem v. 
Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983) 
and modified by Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 111 
S.Ct. 2680, 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991). Hence, it is the 
modified test as stated in Brown that is the current legal 
standard for review of a claim of cruel and unusual 
punishment in Idaho. State v. Robertson, 130 Idaho 287, 
288,939 P.2d 863, 864 (Ct.App.1997). As the Brown Court 
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stated: 
We limit our proportionality analysis to death penalty cases 
and, under the Idaho Constitution ... to those cases which 
are "out of proportion to the gravity of the offense 
committed" in the cruel and unusual punishment setting 
similar to the "grossly disproportionate" analysis of the 
[E]ighth [A]mendrnent urged by Justices Kennedy, 
O'Connor, and Souter in Harmelin. 
Brown, 121 Idaho at 394, 825 P.2d at 491. Therefore, this 
Court must first make a threshold comparison of the crime 
committed and the sentence imposed to determine 
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whether the sentence leads to an inference of gross 
disproportionality. Robertson, 130 Idaho at 289,939 P.2d at 
865. The burden of demonstrating that a sentence is cruel 
and unusual is on the person asserting the constitutional 
violation. State v. Clay, 124 Idaho 329, 332, 859 P.2d 365, 
368 (Ct.App.1993). 
Shanahan pied guilty to first degree murder. Pursuant to a 
plea agreement, the state agreed not to seek the death 
penalty and, thus, the maximum penalty Shanahan faced in 
this case was fixed life imprisonment. I.C. § 18-4004. He 
also pied guilty to robbery, the permissible penalty for 
which is not less than five years, extending to life. I.C. § 
18-6503. Shanahan was sentenced to concurrent unified life 
terms, with thirty-five years and ten years fixed. He argues 
that these sentences "are out of all proportion to the gravity 
of the offenses committed." 
The facts of this case show that Shanahan spoke of killing 
the victim on the day before the homicide and, although 
later denying any racial motivation for the crime, referred to 
the victim as a "Mexican bitch." Shanahan sawed off the 
murder weapon so that it could be more easily concealed. 
When Shanahan entered the store, he had already decided 
that he would kill the victim, even though, by his own 
admission, it was unnecessary to do so to perpetrate the 
robbery. Shanahan walked up behind the victim and fatally 
shot her in the back of the head. After looking at the victim 
as she lay on the floor, Shanahan took money and 
merchandise and fled. 
Based on the record before this Court, and given the 
premeditated and cold-blooded nature of this crime, we 
cannot say that the sentences are out of proportion to the 
gravity of the offenses committed or are such as to shock 
the conscience of reasonable people. Indeed, the seriousness 
of the crime to which Shanahan pied guilty, an 
execution-style homicide, mandates a punishment in the 
form of a substantial prison sentence. State v. Whiteley, 132 
-
Idaho 678, 680, 978 P.2d 238, 240 (Ct.App.1999). See 
alsoState v. Hooper, I 19 Idaho 606,609, 809 P.2d 467,470 
(1991). Consequently, it is unnecessary to conduct any 
further proportionality review. SeeBrown, 121 Idaho at 394, 
825 P.2dat491. [2] 
C. Sentences 
Shanahan further contends, that even if the sentences are 
not cruel and unusual, they constitute an abuse of 
discretion. [3) He argues that the sentences "are greater than 
are necessary to accomplish any and/or all" of the goals of 
sentencing. 
An appellate review of a sentence is based on an abuse of 
discretion standard. State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 582 P.2d 
728 (1978). Where a sentence is not illegal, the appellant 
has the burden to show that it is unreasonable, and thus a 
clear abuse of discretion. State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385, 
393,825 P.2d 482, 490 (1992). A sentence may represent 
such an abuse of discretion if it is shown to be unreasonable 
upon the facts ofthe case. Statev. Nice, 103 Idaho 89,645 
P .2d 323 ( 1982). A sentence of confinement is reasonable if 
it appears at the time of sentencing that confinement is 
necessary "to accomplish the primary objective of 
protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related 
goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution applicable 
to a given case." State v. Toohi/1, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 
P.2d 707, 710 (Ct.App.1982). Where an appellant contends 
that the sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh 
sentence we conduct an independent review of the record, 
having regard for the nature of the offense, the character of 
the offender and the protection of the public interest. State 
v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771,653 P.2d 1183 (Ct.App.1982). 
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This case presents the senseless, cold-blooded, and 
unprovoked murder ofFideia Tomehak. On the night before 
the murder, Shanahan talked about robbing the store in 
order to finance his trip to Las Vegas. Shanahan also spoke 
of potentially killing the clerk. Shanahan was offered 
money from his friends to fund his trip, making the robbing 
of the store unnecessary. However, Shanahan refused the 
generosity of his friends. On the morning of the crime, 
Shanahan, Jenkins, and Lundquist drove to Jenkins' home 
and obtained three weapons. Shanahan participated in 
sawing off the weapons so that they would be easier to 
conceal. At one point, because Jenkins was going to ruin a 
weapon, Shanahan directed him to alter another gun, while 
Shanahan finished sawing off the weapon correctly. 
Shanahan loaded the gun that he would eventually use in 
the murder. 
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Shanahan drove the group to the store. As the three 
individuals were discussing the role each would take in the 
robbery, Shanahan agreed to be one of those to go into the 
store and the one to shoot the clerk. After arriving at the 
store, Shanahan filled up his car and two cans with gasoline 
waiting for possible witnesses to leave. He then told Jenkins 
to go into the store because the plan called for Jenkins to 
distract the clerk so that she could not activate any alarm 
that might have been present. Before following Jenkins into 
the store, Shanahan put gloves on so that he would not 
leave fingerprints at the scene. Also before entering the 
store, Shanahan had determined that he would kill the clerk, 
even though it was unnecessary to do so. Shanahan entered 
the store, concealing the rifle behind bis legs. He walked to 
within three feet of the victim. He raised the gun, lowered 
it, then raised it again and fired into the back of Tomchak's 
head, killing her. Shanahan walked over to the victim and 
looked at her. Shanahan then searched the store for other 
witnesses, testifying that if he found any other people in the 
store, they would also have been killed. Finally, Shanahan 
went to the cash register and took money and cigarettes. He 
then fled the scene. 
Shanahan does not argue that the district court had 
insufficient information before it when it imposed the 
sentences in this case, nor does be contend that the district 
court ignored any evidence presented. Shanahan argues that 
the district court should have given greater consideration to 
his age, his immaturity, and his mental condition. When it 
imposed the sentences in this case, the district court 
specifically considered the testimony of Dr. Heinbecker, a 
psychiatrist, who testified during the sentencing hearing. As 
the district court set forth in its sentencing memorandum, 
Dr. Heinbecker stated that Shanaban's thinking was 
"immature and uninformed" and that Shanahan had "no 
comprehension of the gravity of killing someone." 
According to Dr. Heinbecker, Shanahan, at the time of 
sentencing, still did not fully appreciate the seriousness of 
the crime. The district court also specifically noted 
Shanahan's life history--his parents' divorce, his lack of a 
role model and his low self-esteem. Finally, the district 
court noted that, although Shanahan was suffering from 
depression at the time of the crime, he was capable of 
distinguishing between right and wrong and had the ability 
to conform his behavior to societal standards. 
Moreover, the district court extensively addressed the four 
factors of sentencing when it imposed the sentences in the 
instant case. Based on Shanahan's testimony and demeanor 
while testifying at his co-defendant's trial and the testimony 
of Dr. Heinbecker during sentencing, the district court 
found that a "substantial period of incarceration is necessary 
to protect society from any further violence." The primary 
consideration in sentencing is, and presumptively always 
will be, the good order and protection of society. All other 
factors are, and must be, subservient to that end. State v. 
Hunnel, 125 Idaho 623, 873 P.2d 877 (1994); State v. 
Pederson, 124 Idaho 179, 857 P.2d 658 (Ct.App.1993). 
Therefore, the district court properly considered the 
paramount goal of sentencing. Under the facts of this case, 
this consideration alone would be sufficient to support the 
district court's sentencing decision. SeeSimons v. State, 116 
Idaho 69, 77, 773 P.2d 1156, 1164 (Ct.App.1989) ("A 
sentence need not serve all of [the] 
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goals; in appropriate circumstances, one may be 
sufficient."). 
The district court also addressed the goal of deterrence. 
Although it questioned whether anyone other than 
Shanahan would be deterred by the sentences it imposed, 
the district court correctly noted that first degree murder 
and robbery "cannot be tolerated" by society and that "those 
who may contemplate such actions must be reminded of the 
severe sanctions which will surely follow." The district 
court next addressed Shanahan's rehabilitative potential, 
finding that "there is hope" that Shanahan may eventually 
become a contributing member of society. Thus, the district 
court determined that a fixed life sentence was 
inappropriate. Finally, with regard to punishment, the 
district court stated that Shanahan's actions "require severe 
punishment even considering his age." 
Although the sentences in the instant case are severe, the 
Court cannot hold that they are excessive under any 
reasonable view of the facts. Therefore, based on the record 
before it, this Court concludes that the district court did not 
abuse its discretion. 
D. Rule 35 
Finally, Shanahan argues that the district court abused its 
discretion when it denied his !.C.R. 35 motion. A motion to 
reduce an otherwise lawful sentence under Rule 35 is 
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. 
Robertson, 130 Idaho 287, 289, 939 P.2d 863, 865 
(Ct.App.1997). Such a motion is essentially a plea for 
leniency, which may be granted if the sentence originally 
imposed was unduly severe. State v. Lopez, 106 Idaho 447, 
450, 680 P.2d 869, 871 (Ct.App.1984). The denial of a 
motion for reduction under Rule 35 will not be disturbed on 
appeal absent a showing that the court abused its sentencing 
discretion. Robertson, 130 Idaho at 289, 939 P.2d at 865. 
The criteria for examining rulings denying the leniency 
requested are the same as those applied in determining 
whether the original sentence was unreasonable. Lopez, I 06 
Idaho at 450, 680 P.2d at 872. The criteria for examining 
the original sentences in the instant case are set forth above. 
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If the sentence is not excessive when pronounced, the 
defendant must show that it is excessive in view ofnew or 
additional information presented with the motion for 
reduction. State v. Hernandez, 121 Idaho 114, 117, 822 
P.2d 1011, 1014 (Ct.App.1991). If the defendant fails to 
make this showing, we cannot say that denial of the motion 
by the district court represents an abuse of discretion. Id. at 
117-118, 822 P.2d at 1014-15. 
In this case, Shanahan did not provide any new or 
additional information in support of his Rule 35 motion. 
Because we have already determined that the sentences 
were not excessive when originally pronounced, and 
because no new or additional information was presented to 
the district court in connection with the Rule 35 motion, we 
cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in 




We hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion 
when it denied Shanahan's motion to be sentenced as a 
juvenile. Moreover, this Court holds that concurrent unified 
life sentences, with thirty-five years fixed for first degree 
murder and ten years fixed for robbery, do not constitute 
cruel and unusual punishment under the facts of this case. 
Finally, we hold that the sentences are not excessive and 
that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it 
denied Shanahan's Rule 35 motion for reduction of those 
sentences. Therefore, the concurrent unified life sentences, 
with thirty-five years fixed for first degree murder and ten 
years fixed for robbery, are affirmed. 
Judge LANSING and Judge SCHWARTZMAN concur. 
Notes: 
[l) Although fifteen years old at the time of the 
commission of these crimes, Shanahan was automatically 
prosecuted as an adult. See l.C. § 20-509(1). 
[2) The Court also declines Shanahan's invitation to 
compare his sentences to those of his co-defendants. Such a 
comparison is unnecessary because Shanahan has failed to 
demonstrate that his sentence is grossly disproportionate to 
the crimes he committed. Moreover, each co-defendant 
played a different role and, in one case, pied guilty to a 
different crime than Shanahan. Thus, any comparison to 
Shanahan's co-defendants would be inappropriate. 
[3) Shanahan also contends that the district court erred 
when it considered his juvenile record during sentencing. 
-
However, the district court explicitly stated that it did not 
consider that record as an aggravating factor during 
sentencing. Thus, Shanahan's contention is unsupported by 
the record. 
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AFFIDAVIT OF CHRISTOPHER T. SHANAHAN 
I, Christopher Shanahan, declare under penalty of perjury: 
1. I am currently serving a sentence of life in prison, with 35 years fixed, for first 
degree murder, and a concurrent life sentence, with 10 years fixed, for robbery. 
2. I was 15 years old when I was arrested and charged as an adult. I have been in 
custody ever since. I am now 3 7 years old. 
3. I am here because one fateful day in 1995 I shot Mrs. Fidela Tomehak, who 
worked at a convenience store, and I stole money and cigarettes. I was at the store with two other 
boys, my co-defendants Benjamin Jenkins and Thomas Lundquist. They have both been paroled. 
I confessed, pied guilty, and was sentenced by the Honorable Brent Moss. 
4. I committed these crimes as an ignorant, self-centered, misguided, and troubled 
child. I knew my actions were wrong but I had very little comprehension of the actual impact and 
effects they would have. 
5. Each year that has since passed has brought me a deeper and more painful 
understanding of the magnitude and finality of my actions. Now, as a man entering middle age, I 
struggle to comprehend the thinking and behavior of my younger self. I am both horrified and 
disgusted by the immense pain and damage that I have caused so many so senselessly taking 
Mrs. Tomchak's life. I am deeply sorry for what I've done a.fld give my sincerest apologies to 
everyone who I have hurt with my actions, Mrs. Tomchak's family most of all. I know that will 
never be enough, but it is what I feel. 
6. Seeing the pain and damage that I caused my family, as well as beginning to 
understand how far and to how many others that pain and damage extended, motivated me to 
choose a different and better direction for my life. 
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7. After a few years of adjustment as a teenager trying to survive in the adult prison 
system, I began to make a turnaround. I decided to redouble my efforts to learn, to work hard, to 
become rehabilitated, and to give what little I could to help the community in which I find 
myself. I owe a huge debt of gratitude to my friends and my family, who have really provided a 
rock of support for me on which to build, and they still do. 
8. I have had one disciplinary offense report in the last 18 years - for obtaining 
music outside of commissary. Other than that, I have been DOR-free since 1999. 
9. I am proud of my work with the Inmate Dog Alliance Project ofldaho since 2009. 
I train and teach at-risk shelter dogs. I also train the new dog handlers. I was previously 
employed as an office clerk with Midstates as part of the Prison Industries work program. I have 
been recognized, with distinction, for my participation in the Boise State/ISCC Debate Initiative. 
I have been a team member since 2016. 
10. Even though my arrest stopped me from attending school, I received my High 
School Equivalency in 1996. I've completed the Core Curricula class in prison and a class in 
basic computer skills. I have earned 24 credits from Ohio University. 
11. I decided to take classes and courses voluntarily in prison without being required 
to do so by programming. I've successfully completed Cognitive Self-Change (Phase I) - twice, 
Cognitive Self-Change Community Model Program - as a member and mentor, Cage Your Rage 
Anger Management - twice, Breaking Barriers, Substance Abuse Education and Recovery, Life 
Skills, Thinking Errors Orientation, Relapse Prevention, and Breaking Barriers. I've been trained 
and have certificates from the National Center for Construction Education in Plumbing, Levels 
One and Two, and Electrical Wiring, Level One. 
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12. I've also have been trained in exercise science. I've received training certificates 
as an Endurance Training Specialist, Weight Training Specialist, and Sports Nutrition Specialist. 
I am a certified Master Fitness Trainer from the National Federation of Professional Trainers. 
13. I am asking the Commission to allow me to present additional information to 
show to you my sincere remorse for what I've done and to show you how I have been 
rehabilitated since my youth, either with documentary materials or, better yet, at an in-person 
hearing. 
Further affiant sayeth naught. 
Dated this {iQ_ day of June, 2017. 
Christoplier Shanahan 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this g'b day of "'.lV'- A£--.-, 2017. 
Notary Public: 7-y;= 
Residing at C .0, 10 1 ---.\.v:----:: C 1>, f\,~ .,ft:v .. \ 
My commission expires: 
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Craig H. Durham 
ISB No. 6428 
FERGUSON DURHAM, PLLC 
223 N. 6th Street, Suite 325 
Boise, ID 83701 
chd@fergusondurham.com 
T: 208-345-5183, ext. 1000 
F: 208-906-8663 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
CHRISTOPHER T. SHANAHAN, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CR-95-502 
AFFIDAVIT OF LYNN 
SHANAHAN 
I, Lynn Shanahan, declare under penalty of perjury: 
1. I am an adult and competent to testify about these matters. 
2. I make these statements based on my personal knowledge. 
3. I am Christopher Shanahan's stepmother. I have known Chris personally since his 
father, David, and I got together in 2008. At the time, Chris was incarcerated at the North Fork 
Institution, in Sayre, Oklahoma. We would see him every couple of months, driving up from our 
home in Austin, Texas. Chris was moved not long after that back to Boise. 
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4. For many years, I worked as a Dispatcher/Administrative Support for the Alaska 
State Troopers. From that perspective, it was a little hard for me to understand the situation 
involving Chris's incarceration. 
5. The more time that I have spent with Chris, the more I have come to love this 
kind hearted, warm and gentle person. He is certainly not the young man that committed a 
terrible crime 22 years ago that no one could have fathomed he was capable of committing. 
6. For instance, during his time at ISCC, he has worked with the Idaho Humane 
Society and their Inmate Dog Alliance Project of Idaho (IADPI) for the past 7 years. Through 
that program, he has been provided the opportunity to teach dogs the social skills they need to be 
adopted into a forever home. It has given him the ability to be empathetic to animals that have 
serious behavior and socialization issues due to previous negative environments. He teaches 
them to overcome those fears, and to learn to trust, interact, and love human contact. 
7. I have also seen how proud he is to have been picked to work with the Boise State 
University Debate Team for the past two years and to be one of the top debaters in his class. His 
instructors have been extremely impressed with his work ethic and his dedication try to be the 
best he can be in every task he has been given. 
8. Even though he was only 15 when he was taken into custody, Chris finished his 
High School Equivalency and has taken college credits from Ohio University. He has also 
voluntarily completed numerous classes and courses in the prison. He has set aside time over the 
last 14 years to tutor other inmates in basic educational and computer skills. 
9. On many occasions during my visits, once correctional officers of staff have 
mentioned to me what a wonderful, respectful man he is toward them and how bad they feel 
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about his situation. They tell me he is not typical of the inmates that they encounter on a day-to-
day basis. 
10. I know that Chris isn't the same young  kid that was dealing with a 
broken home, peer pressure, and the underdeveloped mind of an adolescent with very little adult 
supervision or guidance. He has matured into a fine man and I am proud of him. 
11. I want to be clear, though, that in saying all of this I certainly do not mean to 
excuse what he did or detract in any way from the immeasurable harm that he caused to his 
victim and her family. Chris does not want that either. 
11. In fact, in many conversations or written communication that I have had with him 
over the last 9 years, he has expressed to me the upmost regret that he has for the unspeakable 
crime that he has committed. I have seen how he struggles with the knowledge of his actions and 
the lives it affected, not only the victim's family but his own family. He acknowledges the 
devastation, the hurt, and the pain that everyone has suffered and still does suffer due to his 
crime. He knows he can't take that back. All he can do is become a better person, to learn from 
his mistakes and actions and do everything he can to right a wrong. He now shows so much 
compassion for everyone involved and he still struggles with composing himself in front of me 
and his father. 
12. I have personally seen how Chris strives every day to become a better person 
through his actions and, with concentrated effort, to learn everything he can to make his 
transition someday back into society. He has made it his goal to become a person who will make 
a contribution, will give back, and will leave a positive mark. 
Further affiant sayeth naught. 
Dated this __ day of ____ , 2017. 
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✓ --SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this 1_ day of ~ ..._.._4 , 2017. 
Notary Public: ~ 
--~ Restdmgat 
My commission expires: 
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Craig H. Durham 
ISB No. 6428 
-
FERGUSON DURHAM, PLLC 
223 N. 6th Street, Suite 325 
Boise, ID 83701 
chd@fergusondurham.com 
T: 208-345-5183, ext. 1000 
F: 208-906-8663 
Attorney for Defendant 
-
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
CHRISTOPHER T. SHANAHAN, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CR-95-502 
AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID 
SHANAHAN 
I, David Shanahan, declare under penalty of perjury: 
1. I am an adult and competent to testify about these matters. 
2. I make these statements based on my personal knowledge. 
3. I am Christopher Shanahan 's father. I am making these statements not just to add 
to other statements by family and friends, but rather as a sincere and honest assessment of the 
changes I have personally witnessed in Chris's personality and maturity over these many years. 
4. Chris's mother and I divorced when he was just a young boy and, like so many 
other children from broken homes, it had an immediate and devastating effect on his 
AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID SHANAHAN - I 
51     04/09/2018
- -
development and personality. During the divorce proceedings, I moved away and was not there 
for him as I should have been. 
5. Chris was always a sweet child who wanted to please those around him. It wasn't 
long after the divorce that his intense need to be liked and to be wanted started to come out in 
negative ways. As he grew into his teens, he seemed to be liked by his peers, but I could see that 
he was always going the extra mile to impress them or to make sure he was part of the group. 
6. During our bi-weekly phone conversations, I noticed little changes in his 
behavior. He seemed more impulsive and gave little thought to his actions or the consequences of 
his actions. These behaviors seemed only to get worse over time. 
7. The one thing that never changed was that he had a good heart. He never had any 
violent tendencies and never wanted to see anyone or anything hurt. That is what made this crime 
such a shock to everyone who knew him. 
8. When I first heard about what had happened, I thought that Chris could not have 
been the one who pulled the trigger. It just went against everything that I knew about him. 
9. Chris once told me that he may never be able to understand fully how he could 
have done something that day that he could never have done before or after. It was a decision 
that changed the lives of so many. 
10. In the intervening years, Chris has never blamed anyone other than himself for his 
circumstances. On many occasions, he has expressed remorse to me for his actions and often 
how he just wanted to be able to relate those feelings to the victim's family. 
11. Chris has literally grown up in prison and has led his life in a manner that, if ever 
given the opportunity, shows he could become a productive member of society. So many young 
people who are put into the system seem to become a part of the system. Chris is one of the few 
AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID SHANAHAN - 2 
52     04/09/2018
-
who has refused to become institutionalized and has spent every day making sure that he is 
working on bettering himself as a person, friend, and family member. I can't begin to count the 
times during our visits with Chris that a staff member has come over to me and expressed what a 
wonderful man he is, and how they can't believe that he is in prison. Anyone who has ever met 
Chris or spent time around him will tell you that he is now intelligent, sweet, caring, and loving. 
12. Chris has always tried to stay busy and to use his time productively, whether it is 
his participation in the IDAPI program to train behaviorally-challenged dogs, which he is so 
passionate about, or the Debate program in which he has excelled, or when he tutors and helps 
others further their educations. He sincerely cares about those around him. 
13. When I speak to him, there is no sense of institutionalization in his words or 
appearance. He has done what I never thought could be done given his surroundings and 
circumstances. He has chosen not to behave in a manner like so many others who are 
institutionalized. Chris is a poster-child of someone who, if given a second chance, could become 
a productive and contributing member of society. His need to help others comes from a place 
deep within. 
14. Chris has grown and matured into a man whom I am proud to call my son. I 
would put him around anyone, young or old, with no fear or hesitation. He is not the young, 
immature, and impulsive  boy who entered the system so many years ago. He was a 
child with a child's mentality who made a very poor choice and has paid a very severe price, that 
by his own admission, he should have paid. He deserves and should be given an opportunity to 
prove himself. 
15. We only ask that that the courts and those involved in reviewing this case 
recognize how far this man has come, and see him for who he really is today. A role model, and 
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an example for so many of the positive traits that can come even to someone who has committed 
the worst of crimes. Give this young man a chance. He sincerely deserves it. 
Further affiant sayeth naught. 
l"j#i . ---r' 
Dated this L.._ day ofJd.A?e , 2017. 
~-u.-✓~,, _ · ~ ·- . ~ 
DavidS anaha 
, ......... ,,, (~, 
~Ji.~~~'&J!d SWORN to before me this.:@_ day of~• 2017 . 
,~~ ............. ~..,;, ~ (J('~~;y)~) NoraryPublic: J [)w 
• • PLJeL\C • • Residing at ~. --~' '.. ~ _ \ .p·... • •. •01 ; .. ,-~ . . ~~ ~ ..... ~..,">,········ ~T~Oj .... ,,I£ Of \{J,,, .... ,,,,, ...... . . . 
fffy'i.;omm1ss1on expues: 
01 /~5 lc20.1 3 
l 7 
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FERGUSON DURHAM, PLLC 
223 N. 6th Street, Suite 325 




Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON 
STA TE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
CHRISTOPHER T. SHANAHAN, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CR-95-502 
DECLARATION OF MEAGAN 
SHANAHAN METER 
I, Meagan Shanahan Meter, declare under penalty of perjury: 
1. I am an adult and competent to testify about these matters. 
2. I make these statements based on my personal knowledge. 
3. I am Christopher Shanahan's younger sister. I was 12 years old when 
Chris went to prison at 15, so I've had a unique perspective of watching Chris grow into 
the man he is today. 
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4. Today I am 33 years old and married with three children ages 15, 13, and 
11-two sons and a daughter. 
5. My oldest son is the age that Chris was when he committed that horrible 
crime 22 years ago - a decision that changed so many lives forever. When I look at my 
son today, I think about what it would be like for him to enter the prison system at his 
age and maturity level and all the ways which that experience could affect who he is 
and could tum out to be. It forces me to think about my brother from a new viewpoint, 
a mother's viewpoint. It has changed how I parent, how I communicate with my 
children, even how I love them. 
6. Twenty-two years ago, Chris was a young, naive, impulsive teenage kid 
who lacked self-confidence and leadership skills. He was also caring, compassionate, 
intelligent and funny. Chris loved animals with a passion and would rescue all sorts of 
animals from kittens to squirrels. These were just a few of the characteristics 
of a young kid who would soon make a decision that would devastate so many. This 
was who he was when he entered prison 22 years ago. 
7. Today Chris is a  man who has lived more years inside of 
prison walls than he did outside. He has been raised in a prison, which is significant to 
recognize knowing the incredible person he is. Today he is someone who fully 
recognizes the consequence of his actions. Many who spend a significant amount of 
time in prison turn out to be a reflection of their environment. You could say some even 
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become better criminals. This IS NOT Chris's story. He is who he is IN SPITE of his 
environment. 
8. The kid I mentioned before, the kid who was naive, impulsive, and lacked 
leadership skills- that's not his story 22 years later. 
9. Today I consider Chris to be a role model for my boys. He is self-confident 
in his ability to affect change, good change. He has made a positive impact on so many 
around him. He has expressed real remorse over his actions and, between processing 
that and living the experience that prison is in general, he has been motivated to better 
himself and help better the lives of those around him. He has educated himself, he has 
tutored other inmates and he is part of the IDAPI program training and rehabilitating 
dogs, giving them another chance at life. Most recently he was chosen to participate in 
the Boise State Prison Debate Initiative where he learned more than just oratory skills. 
He now expresses that his self-confidence was boosted and he was inspired to do 
something in our communities to help kids just like him. 
10. Working as a leader in a youth group for troubled kids, I know that being 
able to work with youth is a unique and special opportunity. When you can do it from 
an empathetic perspective, understanding their thought processes and considering their 
circumstances, the impact you can have is life changing for the youth you are serving as 
well as for yourself in the lessons you learn from them. 
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11. Not only have the consequences of Chris's actions served as a valuable 
lesson to my boys, but so has his advice and instruction. He's shown me that embracing 
my boys' interests and guiding them in a positive way is important. That you can't take 
a natural love and interest for something out of a child, but you can guide and nurture 
that interest to have a positive impact and outcome in their lives. Conversations I've 
had with Chris over the years have shown me the genuine change, maturity and overall 
desire to do better and be better are characteristics of who Chris is today. 
12. I know the crime Chris committed 22 years ago was not a result of a flaw 
inherent to who he is. It was the result of various factors that led to that decision. He is 
not by nature a violent or dangerous person. In fact, his wrongdoing was the one and 
only violent crime Chris has ever committed - even living in a prison culture that can be 
inherently violent. That alone is a great example of who he really is. He made a horrible 
mistake, but it IS NOT who he is and should not define him for the rest of his life. 
13. When Chris is able to experience life outside the confines of prison walls, 
I'm certain that his impact will be incredible. He has an amazing support team of people 
outside just waiting to cheer him on and we, too, can't wait to see what he will do. We 
don't want his actions 22 years ago to be in vain. He made a horrible decision that can't 
be undone, but we hope to see him get the opportunity to give back to his community 
in a way that may change the path of someone else in a positive way. I hope that you all 
will consider giving him that opportunity. 
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Under Idaho Code§ 9-1406, I declare under penalty of perjury pursuant to the 
laws of the State of Idaho that the foregoing is true and correct. 
EXECUTED on this ~ ht day of June, 2017. 
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EXHIBIT F 
Declaration of JaNae Shanahan 
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Craig H. Durham 
ISB No. 6428 
-
FERGUSON DURHAM, PLLC 
223 N. 6th Street, Suite 325 
Boise, ID 83701 
chd@fergusondurharn.com 
T: 208-345-5183, ext. 1000 
F: 208-906-8663 
Attorney for Defendant 
-
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
CHRISTOPHER T. SHANAHAN, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CR-95-502 
DECLARATION OF JaNAE 
SHANAHAN 
I, JaNae Shanahan, declare under penalty of perjury: 
1. I am Chris Shanahan's morn. I have two children: Chris and his younger 
sister, Meagan, and I have three grandchildren. I am 56 years old and live in Rigby, 
Idaho. I currently serve as the church office secretary for the Watersprings Church in 
Idaho Falls, Idaho. 
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2. I am providing this declaration simply to offer a glimpse of who Chris 
was when this horrible crime happened over twenty years ago, and who he has become. 
I say these things in no way to take the focus away from, or to minimize, the enormous 
loss that the Tomehak family has suffered. I understand, and Chris understands, that is 
something that is always present. No words can describe my sympathy for Mrs. 
Tomchak's family and friends. Instead, I humbly offer these thoughts only in the hope 
that they will be of some assistance in showing my son's growth from an immature, 
impulsive, and troubled young boy to the caring, responsible, and morally mature man 
he is today. 
3. Chris was . He was welcomed and loved. He is 
my first born and only son. 
4. Sadly, Chris's father and I had a very unstable relationship, and by the 
time Chris was 10 years old, his father and I had been married and divorced twice. The 
latter divorce was particularly hard. Overnight, dad just left. It was very damaging. 
5. Our home life turned upside down. I was devastated by the breakup and 
just couldn't pull it together to create a happy and productive home life. It was always a 
struggle to make ends meet. I worked full time and our life really became one of 
survival. The kids were at school and daycare or grandma and grandpa's during school 
months and at daycare in the summer. 
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6. We moved to a much smaller home in town, which was okay, but another 
change. Dave was not consistent with visits and that was disappointing for the kids, 
especially when plans had been made. Other relationships that Dave and I had brought 
outside people into their lives and that was also hard on them. Other than having 
wonderful, loving and stable grandparents, the kids didn't have very solid home life. 
7. Chris started showing signs of anger and sadness and was diagnosed with 
clinical depression at 10 years old. He was given medication (Zoloft) which just seemed 
to make his emotional state worse, so we stopped the medication and he continued in 
counseling for a while. 
8. A year or so after our divorce Dave was arrested. The incident was 
broadcast on local news and the kids were devastated and embarrassed. Dave was 
sentenced to 14 years but given a rider which reduced his sentence to 1 ½ or 2 years. 
Most of the time he served was in Northern Idaho so the kids only saw him once during 
that time (while he was in the Burley jail). 
9. Even though Chris was very intelligent, handsome, kind, personable, and 
loved, when he reached the 7th grade he began to struggle. At this age all the kids from 
surrounding areas came together for school for the first time. The kids he had chased 
with in grade school were not as inviting to him to join them at this point. He was from 
a broken family in a small town where most residents were of a specific religious belief 
that we were not active in. Most moms and dads attended functions, but he didn't have 
DECLARATION OF JaNAE SHANAHAN - 3 
64     04/09/2018
that. I was working and his dad wasn't available. His grandparents were gone during 
the winter months. 
10. Dave moved to Idaho Falls upon his release from prison. The kids spent 
almost every other weekend with him until he moved to Twin Falls, when Chris was 
about 13. 
11. Chris started hanging out with a group of kids during the 7th and 8th 
grade years, most of whom were also from hurt and broken families. They were good 
individuals, but not good as a group. By the time they hit the 9th grade they were 
testing the waters and our house had become the house they all gathered at after school. 
I worried about what was going on, but worked 20 miles away and couldn't be there 
after school. Chris knew he wasn't supposed to have them over, but his need for peer 
acceptance kept him from following the rules. At this point his dad and I decided he 
should go live with him in Twin Falls to get him out of the crowd he was hanging with 
and have time with dad. 
12. On Chris's 15th birthday he moved to Twin Falls to live with his father 
where he finished his 9th grade year. Chris was not happy about moving but did look 
forward to having father and son time. The time was cut short, though, because his 
dad's girlfriend and children moved in with them shortly after he moved to Twin Falls 
and that changed things. 
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13. Chris moved back home with me in July 1995. His old friends were still 
his friends and they welcomed him home. It wasn't long before they started getting into 
trouble. In August, he and a buddy and a couple of girls stole a sign from the school. 
They got caught and Chris took the blame. He was the only one prosecuted. He ended 
up in juvenile court. 
14. Chris's attorney recommended we go back to counseling. We did. His 
psychiatrist diagnosed him with anxiety and depression and prescribed "Paxil" for him. 
I faithfully made sure he took his medication every day, something I really regret now, 
after learning the harm it can cause to ado]escents (suicide and at-risk behavior, 
including crimes like he committed). From that point on things spiraled out of control. 
Between the months of August through November of 1995 Chris was arrested for 
underage smoking, drinking, busted for having marijuana, and finally the 1st degree 
murder, robbery and weapon charges in November 1995. 
15. I struggle with this declaration, having to point out the challenges of 
Chris's life realizing that most of them are due to circumstances that he was not in 
control of. I was not the parent I should have been, and that, with the absence of his 
father, made it hard and caused a lack of security and discipline. And, most 
importantly, we had a home that was absent of faith and hope (Jesus); the element that 
could have changed everything. 
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16. But Chris has never blamed anyone for the crime he committed at 15 
when he took a gun into a store and shot Mrs. Tomehak to death. His maturity level at 
that age was so young, his comprehension of what he had done was so lacking that 
when he was arrested in Utah (on his way back to Idaho) the officers asked him where 
he was going. He said, "I'm going home to see my mom." 
17. Chris had no idea of the level damage or trouble that he was in. He had 
not comprehended the finality of what his actions had caused. He was not normally one 
who wanted to hurt people; he actually tried to help them up in most cases. But he was 
a mixed-up, confused and troubled  kid that, along with side-effects of a 
prescribed drug, had gotten involved with street drugs and fantasy life-style. He was 
not in his right thinking. He was lost in life. 
18. Chris was held in the county jail for 18 months (until he was sentenced). 
The first few months of incarceration were absolute torture for him. He was isolated in 
a cell by himself. He got his days and nights confused. He couldn't go out among 
population because he was a minor. When they would let him out for recreation, they 
would let him walk around the building or help clean for an hour, but that didn't 
happen every day. He thought he was going to go crazy. He was alone, he was so 
confused, and he wanted me to take him home; he didn't know why or how he did 
what he did. 
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19. It was several weeks before he could maintain during our weekly visits 
and several phone calls during the week. But, by the grace of God, a pastor came and 
ministered to him. He told him about Jesus and that He could forgive Chris for his sins. 
Chris grew up a lot that day. He couldn't wait to tell me all about it. He told me that I 
needed Jesus too. It was a huge breakthrough and Chris began to settle down. We 
started trusting in Jesus. 
20. Chris started reading, and he read and read and read. We couldn't keep 
him in books. Then he was told that when he turned 16 he could start taking his GED 
courses. And he did. And he got through the program quickly with above average 
scores and obtained his GED within the first year of his incarceration. 
21. Chris was transferred to the Idaho State Penitentiary, once sentenced, at 
the . He was held in Maximum Security for 4 years. When he got transferred 
to Medium Security things were much better. Visiting was not nearly so stressful, we 
could eat a sandwich and drink a pop and just talk. He got involved in all the programs 
that he could. He continued to learn as much as was possible and within a few years 
had taken all the programs that the prison required he take. Then he started getting 
involved in other opportunities that were offered (but not required) and he continues to 
get involved in any positive activity or program that he is allowed to be a part of. He 
gives it his all, and he does well. 
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22. When Chris was 23 or 24, the reality and comprehension of what he had 
done finally registered. He was horrified and very critical of himself. He spent 2-3 years 
in a very low state, determining himself unworthy of ever deserving anything. He felt 
that even prison was a benefit that he didn't deserve. He spent days and nights trying 
to figure out what caused him, what allowed him, what would make him do such a 
thing. He still struggles; but he realizes he can't change it. He can only try to become 
someone who is an asset to the community. A person who can't change what he's done 
but maybe he can influence a change in the path of someone else who may be headed in 
the same direction he was. Or somehow make a positive difference in the world. 
23. From then, he has continued to grow and mature into a man whom I am 
very proud to be his mom. He has been involved in community-style groups and 
programs offered through the prison, he's taken college courses (his writing project 
actually became an example included in the professor's student hand guide), achieved 
certifications, has been involved with the dog program for several years, worked (when 
the job was available), and asked for no income help all the time he was employed. He 
paid taxes and was happy about it. He jumps at any opportunity he has and does his 
very best to gain the knowledge so that he can use it in a positive way. The list of his 
accomplishments so far is long, and given the fact that he has been incarcerated since he 
was 15, is to me, remarkable. 
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24. I'll never forget something a guard said to me one day when I was visiting 
Chris. He asked me if I was Chris's mom. When I said "yes" he said, "You should know 
that Chris is one of the nicest people I have ever met." And he meant it. Another official 
told me of how Chris is able to maintain good relations with both inmates and prison 
guards and officials. Something that doesn't happen that often. 
25. Chris is forever trying to help me when I struggle, offering understanding, 
clear thinking, and good suggestions for achievable changes. He has never tried to 
blame us for his situation, even though I know his home life was a huge factor. He looks 
for ways to improve and acts on the opportunities provided to him. He is faithful to 
connect with us and puts forth much effort to maintain a healthy and positive 
relationship with all his family members. 
26. Chris has grown into a fine man, and again I say, I am so proud of him 
and love him very much! · 
Under Idaho Code§ 9-1406, I declare under penalty of perjury pursuant to the 
laws of the State of Idaho that the foregoing is true and correct. 
EXECUTED on this / J./ r+-.day of June, 2017. 
5e--n,.._ J.4J-__ 
· 1 aae Sh~ahan 
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Letters of Charles Toepfer and 
Shanna Nichols Toepfer 
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Sunday, June 4, 2017 
Craig Durhan Attorney at Law 
223 N. 6th Street, Suite 325 
Boise ID 83702 
Dear Craig: 
-
You had asked if I would write a few comments about IDOC inmate Christopher Shanahan 51937. I 
offer the following In his behalf. 
My wffe Shanna and I have been visiting Chris on a regular basis since May of 2006. Chris is the 
grandson of my mother-in-law's brother. When we first met Chris he was a young  man 
who at that time seemed to me to be a little shy but also was very talkative as he had not had any 
visits for several months. We have grown to love and respect him as a result of the tremendous 
gr~h he iK!s-shown In both achievement and sprlt within the confines of the prison system. Chris 
has always been respectful of us and has always remembered every holiday, birthday and other 
special occasions in our lives. He has never asked us to do anything special for him at any time 
outside of our regular visits. Over the years we have had many conversations about his crime and 
have witnessed the remorse he has expressed for his actions when he was a  youth. 
He has expressed his remorse for the pain and suffering he has caused the family of the deceased, 
his family and his community. I believe he Is a fully repentant mature adult with the potential to be 
an outstanding and contributing member of society today. He is an achiever who seeks out 
opportunity for growth, development, and achievement as witnessed by his track record within the 
confines of the prison system. It Is my conviction that It would serve no useful purpose to spend 
tens of thousands per year of tax payer dollars to_warehouse this young man any further. In fact It 
would be counterproductive and may be detrimental to his ability to blend Into society at the end of 
his. p,resent sentence. As you know advancement in Tee knowledge and other areas of society have 
been tremendous over the past twenty three years of his confinement. Further confinement would 
present an even greater dlallenge to him at age 50 when he becomes eligible for prole under his 
present sentence. I sincerely hope this brief statement will help you in achieving a reduced 
sentence for Chris. 
;";'ll / >f._/a/ 
~-... ~.-- .. 
Charles Toepfer 
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STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff. 
vs. 
Christopher T Shanahan 
102 W 2nd N . 
-- .._, Seventh Judicial District Court, State of Idaho 
In and For the County of Jefferson 
210 Courthouse Way, Suite 120 













Case No: CR-1995-0000502 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
Defendant. 
) 






Alan C. Stephens 
Large Courtroom #3 
01:30 PM 
You are ordered to appear personally before this Court for a hearing on the above matter. You are hereby 
further notified of your right to have and to be represented by counsel. 
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of this Notice of Hearing entered by the Court and 
on file in this office. I further certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows on this date Friday, 




Christopher T Shanahan Mailed_L Hand Delivered __ 
Craig H Durham Mailed___i_ Courthouse Mailbox __ 
223 North 6th Street, Suite 325 
Boise, ID 83701 
Paul Butikofer 
PO Box 77 
Rigby, ID 83442 
Mailed__ Courthouse Mailbox____l__ 
Dated: Friday August 11. 2017 
Colleen C Poole 
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2087456636 P;1 
P, 001 
08/21/17 08;56AM POT Fergueon Durham., PLLC -> Prosecuting Atty's 0££ice 2087457342 Pg 
Z/5 
Craig H. Durluu:n 
JSBNo.6428 
FERGUSON DURHAM, PU£ 
m N. 6th Stn,et, Suite 325 
Bolte, ID 83701 
dld@fergwJOndurham.com 
T: 20&-345-5183, e,ct. 1000 
F:208-906-8663 
IN THE DlSTRICT COUJlT Of THE SIMiNTH JUDICIAL DISTJUCT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEl'FllllSON 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plalrltifl 
V. 
CHRISTOPHER T, SHANAHAN, 
Case No. CR-95-502 
8TIPULA TION FOil 
COUNSU TO APPEAR BY 
TELEPHONE AT 
SCHEDULING CONHllENOi 
2017 at 1:30 p.nt. The parties hereby stiptd2.te and move the Court to allow Mr. 
Shanahan's counsel, Craig H. Durham, to appear at the Scheduling c.onference 
by telephone &om his offlce in Boise. 
II 
II 
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Cr.ug H. Dwhatn _ 
Attorney for Ddcndant _ 
DATED: ~ ~f. ZltJ 
Paul Bv.ti.t.afer 
Pro9CCUting Attomey for Jefferson County 
DATED: _______ _ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 22nd day of August, 2017, I served a copy of 
this Stipulation on the following, by faxing a. copy to the following: 
Mr. Paul Butikofer 
Jefferson County Prosecuting Attorney 
POBox77 
Rigby ID 83442 
Fax:208-745-7342 
STIPULATION FOR COUNSEL TO /\PPEAR BY TELEPHONE - 3 
2087456636 Pg 
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Craig II. Durham 
ISB No. 6428 
2017 AUG 22 PM f: 32 
PERGUSON DURI 1AM, PLLC 
223 N. 6th Street, Suite 325 
Boise, ID 83701 
chd@fergusondurham.com 
T: 208-345-5183, ext. 1000 
P: 208-906-8663 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON 
ST A TE or IDAIIO, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
Cl IRISTOPI IER T. SI IAN AI IAN, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CR-95-502 
ORDER GRANTING 
STIPULATION 
Good cause appearing, IT IS I IEREBY ORDERED that the parties' 
Stipulation to Allow Counsel to Appear by Telephone at Scheduling Conference 
is granted. Defendant's counsel, Craig I I. Durham, may appear the Scheduling 
Conference, currently set for August 29, 2017 at 1 :30 p.m., by telephone from his 
office in Boise. 
ORDER-1 
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this ~y of August, 2017, I served a copy of 
this Order on the following: 
Mr. Paul Butikofer 
Jefferson County Prosecuting Attorney 
POBox77 
Rigby ID 83442 
P: 208-745-'7342 
Craig II. Durham 
Perguson Durham, PLLC 
223 N. 6th Street, Suite 325 
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OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
JEFFERSON COUNTY 
Paul G. Butikofer, Prosecutor ISB# 4793 
Michael F. Winchester, Deputy ISB# 9342 
Weston S. Davis, Deputy ISB# 7449 
143 N. State Street Ste. 1 
P.O. Box 77 
Rigby, ID 83442 
(208) 745-5888 (t) 
(208) 745-7342 (f) 
2011 AUG 21t AM 10c 50 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON 
ST A TE OF IDAHO, 
vs. 
Plaintiff, Case No. CR 1995-502 
OBJECTION TO MOTION 
TO CORRECT ILLEGAL 
CHRISTOPHER T. SHANAHAN, SENTENCE AND MOTION TO DISMISS 
Defendant. 
COMES NOW, Michael F. Winchester, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Jefferson 
County, and respectfully objects to Defendant's Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence. Under 
I.R.E. 35, the Court lacks jurisdiction to modify Defendant's sentence because the sentence is not 
illegal and the request was outside the limits of the rule. Therefore, the State moves the Court 
for an order dismissing Defendant's Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURE 
The State requests that the Court take judicial notice of the Court file to verify filing 
dates, contents of affidavits, and transcripts. I.R.E. 202. The State also agrees that Defendant 
was under the age of 18 when the crime was committed. 
On November 10, 1995, after having planned to commit murder, Defendant killed Mrs. 
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Tomehak by shooting her in the back of the head. Findings of the Court and Sentencing Order, 
3-4. On January 25, 1997, Defendant pleaded guilty to violating I.C. § 18-4003(a), Murder I, and 
LC. § 18-6501, Robbery . The Court entered the judgement of conviction on June 3, 1997, and 
sentenced Defendant to serve a fixed term of35 years, with an indeterminate period up to life . 
He filed a timely Motion to Reduce Sentence under I.R.E. 35, which was denied on March 9, 
1999. 
On June 29, 2017, Defendant filed the present Motion to Correct Illegal 
Sentence. In his motion, he argues that he is entitled to a new sentencing hearing under Miller v. 
Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), etal. In his supporting memorandum, Defendant argues that he is 
entitled to relief on three basises: 
1) Defendant' s 35 year sentence violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
2) Defendant' s request is supported by new evidence of his rehabilitation. 
3) There is no compelling government interest in treating a fixed life sentence better 
than a 35-year sentence under Miller. 
The State will address each argument in turn. 
LAW AND ARGUMENT 
The State agrees that Miller v. Alabama generally prohibits fixed life sentences without the 
proper factors being discussed. Miller prohibited fixed-life sentences without the possibility of 
parole of juvenile offenders, Id. at 489, and the State agrees that a sentence that is the functional 
equivalent to life would likely invoke the same protections. However, before Defendant is entitled 
to relief under Miller, he must show that his sentence qualifies. He cannot because the fixed 
portion of his sentence is only 35 years which is less than life and not enough to be the functional 
equivalent. 
2 
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1) The Court lacks jurisdiction under l.R.E. 35 to grant relief because Defendant's non-
life sentence does not qualify for relief under Miller v. Alabama. 
The 120-day time limit established in l.C.R. 35 is jurisdictional, State v. Parvin, 137 
Idaho 783, 785 (Ct.App.2015), as is the bar against subsequent motions under the rule. State v. 
Battens, 137 Idaho, 730, 732-33 (Ct.App. 2002). Therefore, for the Court to have jurisdiction 
under l.C.R. 35, Defendant must show that his sentence is illegal. 
Defendant argues that under Miller v. Alabama, his sentence is illegal and the rule 
applies. This argument is misplaced because Miller only applies to fixed-life sentences or their 
functional equivalents. The 9th Circuit already addressed the issue the applicability of Miller to 
non-life sentences in Demirdjian v. Gipson, 832 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2016). 
In the murder/robbery case Demirdjian, the trial court eventually sentenced the juvenile 
defendant to two consecutive 25 year fixed terms before he was eligible for parole. Id. at 1065. 
After exhausting his state options, the defendant filed a federal habeas action which was denied 
by the district court. On appeal to the 9th Circuit, he argued that his two consecutive 25-year 
terms were the functional equivalent of a life sentence and entitled him to relief under Miller v. 
Alabama. Id. at 1077-78. The 9th Circuit rejected his argument because of the U.S. Supreme 
Court's holding in Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003)(two consecutive 25 year sentences is 
materially distinguishable from a life without parole case because the defendant maintained the 
possibility of parole even though he would be 87-years-old when it became available). The 9th 
Circuit went on to find that even though Demirdjian would be 66 at his parole eligibility date, 
Miller did not apply. 
Defendant was 15-years-old when he went into custody and will be 50-years-old when he 
is eligible for parole. When the holding in Demirdjian is applied to these facts, we can see that 
3 
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Defendant's sentence is not illegal under Miller.I Without illegality, the Court lacks jurisdiction 
under I.RE. 35 and his motion should be dismissed. 
2) The Court lacks jurisdiction to hear any new evidence because more than 120 days 
have passed since imposition of sentence. 
While courts may consider evidence of rehabilitation under I.C.R. 35, they are limited by 
the 120-day time limit. Brandt v. State , 796 P.2d 1023. 1025 (Idaho 1990). Where Defendant's 
sentence was imposed over 120 days prior to filing this request, the request is untimely and the 
Court lacks jurisdiction. 
3) Defendant's sentence does not violate the equal protection clause because he is not 
similarly situated to defendant's serving life sentences contrary to Miller. 
Defendant's argument fails because he cannot point to any law, other than the Supreme 
Court case law, that creates the classification. In fact, he is not arguing that Idaho law violates 
his rights under the Eighth Amendment. He is arguing that the absence of Idaho law violates his 
rights. He has provided no law to support the argument that a State has an affirmative duty to 
pass laws. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion and for the abovementioned reasons, the State asks that the Court deny and 
dismiss Defendant' s Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence. 
DATED this ·J.-y day of August, 2017. 
Pftui 0. Butik-efer, Esq. 
('vl,!Kl,1.:.l f. ~\;11,t:.\1l--;."tc.r'· 
1 While not controlling, the Idaho Court of Appeals, recently held in an unpublished opinion that 
Miller v. Alabama did not apply to sentences other than fixed life. State v. Beeson, 43864. 2016 
WL 3619941 , at* 1 (Idaho App. June 29, 2016). 
4 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the _1j__ day of August, 2017, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing was delivered to the following person(s) by: 
Hand Delivery 
Postage-prepaid Mail 
k/ Facsimile Transmission 
Craig H. Durham, Esq. 
FERGUSONDURHAM, PPLLC 
223 North 6th Street, Suite 325 
Boise, ID 83701 
Michael F. Winchester, Esq. 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT O~.}'i{f'; ~ 
.J/,j1."l'. 'I' 'G 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON.,t-i,tiJt, :"" , _ 4,t~ 
· . ~ 14-r:'il, 'Ul 1 
STATE OF IDAHO Case No. CR-1995-0502 "'lf;p,-,c. 4 
'10~0~ 
vs 
CHRITSOPHER T. SHANAHAN, 
Defendant 
'• lf11-'r 
MINUTE ENTRY RE: 
Scheduling Conference 
This matter came on for hearing on August 29 2017, for scheduling conference, at 4:29 
P.M. in Courtroom #3, before the Honorable Alan C. Stephens, District Judge, sitting in open 
court at Rigby, Idaho. 
The Court Reporter, Mary Ann Elliott, was present. 
Kylee Wetherell, Deputy Court Clerk, was present. 
Paul Butikofer appeared on behalf of the State. 
Craig Durham appeared telephonically. 
The Court addressed parties and stated a motion to dismiss would be scheduled first after which 
a rule 35 could be scheduled if necessary. 
Mr. Durham requested a week to respond to State's Motion to Dismiss 
Court allowed Mr. Durham until September 22, 2017 to respond to State's Motion 
Court allowed Mr. Butikofer until October 6, 2017 to file reply 
Court scheduled this matter for a motion to dismiss on November 20, 2017 for approximately 1 
hour to begin at 3:30 pm 
Notice of hearing and scheduling order will be sent to all parties 
4:38 Court was thus adjourned 
c: Paul Butikofer, Esq. 
Craig Durham, Esq. 
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Seventh Judicial District Court, State of Idaho 
In and For the County of Jefferson 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff. 
vs. 
Christopher T Shanahan 
102 W 2nd N 
Rigby, ID 83442 
Defendant. 
210 Courthouse Way, Suite 120 
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NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is hereby set for: 




Monday, November 20, 2017 
Alan C. Stephens 
Large Courtroom #3 
03:30 PM 
You are ordered to appear personally before this Court for a hearing on the above matter. You are hereby 
further notified of your right to have and to be represented by counsel. 
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of this Notice of Hearing entered by the Court and 
on file in this office. I further certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows on this date Wednesday, 




Christopher T Shanahan Mailed___i_ Hand Delivered __ 
Craig H Durham Mailed_L Courthouse Mailbox __ 
223 North 6th Street, Suite 325 
Boise, ID 83701 
Paul Butikofer 
PO Box 77 
Rigby, ID 83442 
Mailed__ Courthouse Mailbox__:(_ 
Dated: Wednesday, September 06, 2017 
Colleen C Poole 
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Craig H. Durham 
ISB No. 6428 
FERGUSON DURHAM, PLLC 
223 N. 6th Street, Suite 325 
Boise, ID 83702 
chd@fergusondurham.com 
T: 208-345-5183, ext. 1000 
F: 208-906-8663 
Attorney for Defendant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
CHRISTOPHER T. SHANAHAN, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CR-95-502 
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO 
THE STATE'S OBJECTION AND 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
The State has objected to Mr. Shanahan's Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence and 
now seeks dismissal. The Court should deny the State's motion and grant relief on the 
merits, because: 
• The Court has jurisdiction under Rule 35 to determine from the face of the 
record, and after application of the relevant law, whether Mr. Shanahan is 
serving an illegal sentence; 
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• The Court should follow other states' persuasive opinions interpreting Graham, 
Miller, and Montgomery to find that Mr. Shanahan's lengthy fixed term before 
parole consideration triggers Eighth Amendment protection; 
• Idaho's failure to channel the Parole Commission's discretion to assess and give 
weight to the "Miller factors" means that there is an unacceptably high risk that 
Mr. Shanahan will serve a sentence of life without consideration of those factors; 
• Alternatively, regardless of the Court's resolution of the previous claims, the 
logic of recent Supreme Court case law dictates that Mr. Shanahan's sentence 
violates the Eighth Amendment; and 
• Mr. Shanahan is being deprived of a fundamental benefit that is conferred on 
similarly situated juvenile offenders. 
I. The Court has l urisdiction to Reach the Merits 
The State first contends that this Court has no jurisdiction to consider Mr. 
Shanahan' s motion because he was not expressly sentenced to life in prison without the 
possibility of parole. (State's Objection and Motion, pp. 2-3.) The State is not raising a 
jurisdictional question here; it is raising a merits question. That is, the State is 
suggesting that Mr. Shanahan's sentence of life with 35-years-fixed is not illegal. In 
answering that question, this Court must necessarily reach the merits of the claim. 
Mr. Shanahan is not seeking an evidentiary hearing or new factfinding about 
what occurred up to and through his sentencing hearing. The Court has that record 
before it. The Idaho Supreme Court has long held that a district court has jurisdiction 
under Rule 35 to review the face of the record and to apply the law to that record to 
determine whether the prisoner is serving an illegal sentence, which may be corrected 
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"at any time." State v. Clements, 148 Idaho 82, 85, 218 P.3d 1143, 1146 (Idaho 2009). In 
Part I of Mr. Shanahan's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Correct Illegal 
Sentence, that is precisely what he is asking the Court to do. (Memo in Support, pp. 5-
15.) 
Two recent cases from the Idaho Supreme Court support this interpretation. In 
State v. Johnson, Slip Op. 42857, at* 15 (May 12, 2017), the Court characterized Johnson's 
claim that her fixed life sentence was unconstitutional under Miller as one alleging an 
"illegal sentence" (even though it was brought in a post-conviction action). The Court 
noted that "she could not have made the claim that her sentence was illegal under 
Miller's holding interpreting the Eighth Amendment until after Miller was decided." Id. 
(emphasis in original). Similarly, in Windom v. State, Slip Op. 44037, at *9 Guly 10, 2017), 
the Idaho Supreme Court quoted the same passage in Johnson and reiterated that such a 
claim could not have been made until after Miller was decided. 
II. Mr. Shanahan's Lengthy Fixed Period Triggers Miller Protection 
Mr. Shanahan will be incarcerated for a full 35 years - encompassing his teenage 
years, young adulthood, prime adulthood, early middle age, and entering late middle 
age - before even having a glimmer of hope for release at age 50. That is the bulk of a 
productive and meaningful adult life. 
Several jurisdictions have determined that a sentence imposed on a child that 
includes a lengthy term covering meaningful adult years before parole eligibility can be 
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a "de facto" life sentence. In his Memorandum, Mr. Shanahan cited examples such as 
State v. Zuber, 152 A.3d 197 (N.J. 2017) (defendants' parole eligibility at 68 and 72 years 
old), State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41, 71-73 (Iowa 2013) (parole eligibility at 62 years old), 
State v. Houston-Sconiers, 391 P.3d 409 (Wash. March 2, 2017) (non-homicide sentences of 
26 and 32 years before parole consideration). 
Yet another example even closer to home is Bear Cloud v. Wyoming, 334 P.3d 132 
(Wyo. 2014) (Bear Cloud III). There, the defendant was convicted of murder and 
associated felonies when he was 16 years old. The trial court sentenced him to an 
aggregate term of life in prison with parole eligibility when he would be 61. Id. at 136. 
The Wyoming Supreme Court held, in relevant part, that the defendant's 
aggregate sentence was a functional life sentence. Id. at 144. In doing so, it quoted Null 
for the proposition that application of precise life expectancy tables was not necessary: 
"we do not believe the determination of whether the principles of Miller or Graham 
apply in a given case should tum on the niceties of epidemiology, genetic analysis, or 
actuarial sciences in determining precise mortality dates." Id. (quoting State v. Null, 836 
N.W.2d 41, 71 (Iowa 2013); accord People v. Buffer, 75 N.E.3d 470 (Ill. Ct. App. 2017) 
(given the harsh realities of life in prison, the possibility of release at an age that may 
not be full life expectancy is still sufficient to trigger Miller scrutiny); see also State v. 
Pearson, 836 N.W.2d 88, 96 (Iowa 2013) (parole eligibility in non-homicide case at age 52 
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"effectively deprived [Pearson] any chance of an earlier release and the possibility of 
leading a more normal adult life.") 
The linchpin of these cases is the common-sense notion that a few years out of 
prison later in life does not comport with the essential promise of Graham and Miller. To 
be sure, opinions from other state courts reaching different conclusions can be found. 
See, e.g., Bear Cloud III, 334 P.3d at n. 10 (listing cases). But the decisions cited by Mr. 
Shanahan are sound and persuasive. 
The State relies on a federal habeas case from the Ninth Circuit, Demirdjian v. 
Gipson, 832 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2016). That case is inapposite. The Ninth Circuit was 
reviewing a state court decision through the deferential lens of the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDP A). Id. at 1066. To be entitled to relief under AEDP A, 
a state prisoner must show that the state court's decision was "contrary to or an 
unreasonable application of clearly established federal law." Id. Because some "fair-
minded jurists" might agree with the state court in Demirdjian that two consecutive 25-
year sentences did not violate the Supreme Court's juvenile sentencing decisions, the 
petitioner failed to satisfy the demanding AEDPA standard. Id. at 1077. Other fair-
minded jurists, of course, can and have disagreed. 
Mr. Shanahan carries no such burden here. This Court is free - just as were the 
courts of Iowa, Wyoming, Illinois, New Jersey, and Washington, among others- to 
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apply the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence without the blinders and 
restrictions of AEDPA federal habeas review.1 
III. Idaho's Parole Hearings Do Not Comply with Miller and Montg_omery 
The State does not address Mr. Shanahan's argument that there is also an 
unacceptably high risk that he will serve a sentence of natural life in prison without any 
entity assessing the Miller factors. Miller and Montgomery require a meaningful hearing 
at which the attendant characteristics of youth must be considered before a juvenile 
remains in prison until death. Mr. Shanahan has not had that hearing, and Idaho lacks 
any guarantee that he ever will. 
The Idaho Parole Commission has nearly unfettered discretion to deny parole, 
and Idaho courts have long held that there is no due process protection governing the 
process. E.g., Hays v. Craven, 131 Idaho 761,764,963 P.2d 1198, 1201 (Ct. App. 1998). Nor 
do Idaho parole regulations treat offenders who committed crimes as juveniles any 
differently that adult offenders. IDAPA 50.01.01.250. Nothing prevents the Commission 
from, say, giving aggravating weight to the fact that a crime was committed at a young 
The State also cites, in a footnote, an unpublished decision from the Idaho Court 
of Appeals, State v. Beeson, Docket No. 43864 (Ct. App. 2016). (State's Objection and 
Motion, p. 4, n. 1.) As is written on the face of the slip opinion, Beeson "shall not be cited 
as authority." 
And for good reason, as the conclusory opinion lacks a factual description and 
detailed legal analysis, including on such key subjects as when Beeson was (or is) 
eligible for parole (he was sentenced in 1986), or whether any of the arguments that Mr. 
Shanahan makes in this case were made and rejected there. 
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age. Nothing prevents the Commission from simply relying on the heinousness of the 
crime, a fact that will never change, to deny parole. Decisions by the Commission are 
almost unreviewable in court except to determine whether it was supported by a 
rational basis. Banks v. State, 128 Idaho 886, 888-89, 920 P.2d 905, 907---08 (1996). 
Parole review in Idaho after 35 years in prison does not offer a constitutionally 
adequate substitute under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
IV. Mr. Shanahan's Sentence Violates the Eighth Amendment 
Regardless how the Court resolves the previous claims, Mr. Shanahan still 
asserts that his sentence of life with 35 years fixed is unconstitutionally disproportionate 
to the offense. Montgomery built on Miller, which built on Graham, which was an 
extension of Roper. The legal landscape has changed dramatically, and the logical 
progression of these cases is now clear. Given an opportunity, the United States 
Supreme Court will hold that the Eighth Amendment requires that all juvenile 
offenders who were, or will be, prosecuted and sentenced as adults must have 
consideration of the mitigating qualities of youth before sentence is imposed. 
Otherwise, there is an intolerably high risk that their sentences will be based on 
unconstitutional factors. If the mitigating qualities of youth expressed in those cases had 
been considered here, Mr. Shanahan would not be serving 35 years to life. His sentence 
therefore violates the Eighth Amendment and is illegal for that reason alone. 
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V. Other Similarly Situated Juvenile Defendants are Receiving a Benefit 
Denied to Mr. Shanahan 
Finally, the State contends that Mr. Shanahan's equal protection argument is 
unavailing because he has pointed to no law, other than the Supreme Court caselaw, 
that supports it. (State's Objection and Motion, p. 4.) It is precisely Supreme Court 
caselaw that provides a benefit now to similarly situated individuals - resentencing or 
other review under Miller- that is being withheld from Mr. Shanahan unless this Court 
grants relief. 
Mr. Shanahan was automatically charged as an adult at age 15. He was then 
prosecuted and sentenced in all respects as an adult. He is in a class that consists of 
juvenile offenders whose crimes reflect the transient immaturity of youth and who 
faced, or currently face, a potential sentence of life in prison without the possibility of 
parole. Going forward, all members of that class in Idaho and across the country who 
have yet to be sentenced will receive full consideration of the Miller factors. And 
looking back, all offenders who previously received an expressed sentence of LWOP 
also now have an opportunity to convince a factfinder of their rehabilitation and 
potentially receive a significantly reduced sentence. Currently, that benefit is denied to 
Mr. Shanahan. 
One example from Idaho is Ethan Windom. He killed his mother at age 16, 
received a fixed life sentence, and his case has since been remanded for consideration 
under Miller. Windom v. State, Slip Op. 44037, at *11 Ouly 10, 2017). He has an 
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opportunity to convince a judge that his fixed time should be even less that Mr. 
Shanahan's. Unless this Court grants relief, Mr. Shanahan will be treated differently and 
denied a fundamental right under the Eighth Amendment - a Miller hearing - that is 
granted to Mr. Windom, to all others serving juvenile LWOP across the county, and to 
all juvenile defendants with pending or future cases facing a potential life sentence. 
Respectfully submitted this 20th day of September, 2017. 
Craigh~'= 
Attorney for Christopher Shanahan 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 20th day of September, 2017, I served a copy of this 
Memorandum on the following, by depositing a copy, postage prepaid, in the United 
States Mail, addressed to: 
Mr. Paul Butikofer 
Jefferson County Prosecuting Attorney 
PO Box 77 
Rigby ID 83442 
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Paul G. Butikofer, Prosecutor. ISB# 4793 
Michael F. Winchester, Deputy ISB# 9342 
Weston S. Davis, Deputy ISB# 7449 
P.O. Box 77 
Rigby,ID 83442 
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(208) 745-7342 (f) 
FAX No . 
IN THE DISTRJCT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 












Case No. CR-95-502 
STlPULATION TO EXTEND 
BRJEFING SCHEDULE 
P. 002 
COMES NOW, Paul G. Butikofer, Prosecuting Attorney in and for Jefferson County, 
State ofldaho, and Craig H. Durham, Esq .• attorney for defendant, and respectfully .(!J.ove this 
Court for an Otder extending the briefing schedule for one week. 
Said Stipulation is based upon the agreement of the parties aud the fa.ct that the St.ate 
needs additional time to prepare due to scheduling issues. 
DATED this 2 I-day of September, 2017. 
$Lil~ 
Paul G. Butikofer, Esq. 
Deputy Prosecutin.g Attorney 
Craig H. Durhan1, Esq. 
Attorney for Defendant 
-c-:::_::.,· 
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JEFFERSON COUNTY 
Paul G. Butikofer, Prosecutor, ISB# 4793 
Michael F. Winchester, Deputy ISB# 9342 
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P.O. Box 77 
Rigby, ID 83442 
(208) 745-5888 (t) 
(208) 745-7342 (f) 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRJCT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON 
STA TE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff~ 
vs. 














IT JS HEREBY ORDERED that the briefing schedule in the above entitled matter be 
extended until October 13, 2017. 
DATED this~y of tJ vP6-W. 2017./4 . , .. , .......... ,,,,,. 
-----,..-·· .<\\STR1c•,,,., .. 7:==?c_p /y. ....................... )' o··-
( A- / /~ ....... ,.o\. 
-Ju-dg-e-----r-~--~~-!~/~a~;~/y& 1%\ 
··t~-1¼6J-J-~~; .1 
--~-,~c;,···• .............. •·-z~, ~-st 
'.'h,,, 'AL 01s,i\ ,,,,, .... ,,,,,,,,,,111"\"''' 
100     04/09/2018
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
' /~ 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~ay of§J~ r, 2017, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing was delivered to the following person(s) by: 
/ Hand Delivery 
· /Postage-prepaid Mail 
Facsimile Transmission 
Paul G. Butikofer, Esq. 
Prosecuting Attorney 
P.O. Box 77 
Rigby, ID 83442 
Craig H. Durham, Esq. 
FERGUSON DURHAM, PLLC 
223 North 6th Street, Suite 325 
Boise, ID 83701 
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JEFFERSON COUNTY 
Paul G. Butikofer, Prosecutor ISB# 4793 
Michael F. Winchester, Deputy ISB# 9342 
Weston S. Davis, Deputy ISB# 7449 
143 N. State Street Ste. 1 
P.O. Box 77 
Rigby, ID 83442 
(208) 745-5888 (t) 
(208) 745-7342 (f) 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
ST A TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 











Case No. CR 1995-502 
STATE'S REPLY TO 
DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION 
The State, having received Defendant's objection to the State's Objection to Defendant's 
Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence, files its Reply to Defendant's Objection and renews its 
request for the Court to dismiss Defendant's Rule 35 Motion. 
First, the State agrees that juveniles sentenced to life without parole without the benefit of 
a Miller hearing are likely entitled to a new sentencing hearing and that ICR 35 would be the proper 
mechanism to place the request before the Court. However, the sentence must be illegal for the 
Court to have jurisdiction over an otherwise untimely request, ICR 35, and Defendant simply 
cannot show that a 35-year fixed term meets that burden. 
II. Defendant's thirty-five-year fixed term is not the functional equivalent to life. 
The State agrees that a term-of-years can be the equivalent to life, but the line must be 
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drawn somewhere and 35 years for a  offender does not cross the required threshold. In 
support ofhis argument, Defendant cites Bear Cloudv. Wyoming, 334 P.3d 132 (Wyo. 20l4)(Bear 
Cloud III), where the court found for a  defendant who was sentenced to prison until 
at least 61-years-old. However, the Wyoming Supreme Court addressed this case at length in the 
case of the co-defendant in Sen v. State, 390 P.3d 769 (Wyo. 2017)reh'g denied (Apr. 18, 2017), 
and held that a 35-year fixed term in not the functional equivalent oflife. In fact, none of the cases 
cited by the Defendant support a holding that parole eligibility at SO-years-old for murder is the 
functional equivalent of a life sentence. A person released at SO-years-old certainly has 
meaningful opportunity to obtain release. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75 (2010). 
While there seems to be a split on whether a court should consult life expectancy tables, 
Sen at 777, this is a valid method, or at least factor to consider. The Center for Disease Control 
found that the average life expectancy for males in the U.S. population is 76.3 years. NCHS Data 
Brief, No. 267, December 2016, ~1. IRE 201. Twenty-six years is certainly 
meaningful. Defendant could father and raise children, have grandchildren, work a twenty-year 
career, and enjoy retirement. 
It is true that the years he will sit in prison are some of the most productive years of a 
person's life. However, the energy that permits productivity in youth also contributes to criminal 
behavior. In this case that violent behavior was a senseless murder. There is a strong public safety 
argument supporting incarcerating violent offenders during these years. 
III. Defendant lacks standing to argue against the Parole Commission Rules. 
Defendant argues that the Idaho Parole Commission rules do not provide sufficient 
safeguards and that his sentence is therefore illegal. This fails for two reasons: 1) Where he has 
not been denied parole, his claim is not yet ripe, see State v. Manley, 127 P.3d 954, 958 (Idaho 
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2005), and 2) He is only entitled to a meaningful opportunity for parole and not actual parole 
itself. Graham. 
IV. Thirty-five years is not a disproportionate sentence for first-degree murder. 
Defendant argues that his 35-year sentence is disproportionate. This was an absolutely 
unjustifiable premeditated murder done because the Defendant believed that he would be a more 
credible drug dealer if he had a homicide in his past. He speculates that the Supreme Court will 
remand all cases where juveniles were sentences as adults for a Miller hearing despite the fact that 
Miller, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), itself is limited to cases involving life without the possibility of 
parole. The sentence is within the statutory maximum, is not out of proportion to the gravity of 
the offense, does not shock the conscience, and, as addressed above, does not violate Miller. See 
State v. Moore, 906 P.2d 150, 154 (Idaho App. 1995). Therefore, it is proportionate. 
V. Defendant is not similarly situated to juveniles sentenced to life without parole. 
Defendant argues that because both he and someone who was sentenced to life without 
parole as a juvenile are both juveniles and the other person gets a Miller hearing, he is denied equal 
protection. This argument fails because he and the defendant's serving fixed life are simply not in 
the same category. As the State argued previously, there is no statute that grants the right to a 
Miller hearing. That is the Eighth Amendment via Supreme Court decision. Therefore, the 
standard analysis for the constitutionality of a statute does not apply. 
For guidance on this issue, we can look at death penalty cases and the additional protections 
afforded to defendants sentenced to death. I.C.R. 44.2. In Graham, the Supreme Court equated 
life without parole for juveniles to the death penalty which lead to Miller affording additional 
protections. Eventually, in Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S.Ct. 718 (2016), the Supreme Court 
allowed the holding in Miller to retroactively apply to remedy those with a ripe claim: i.e. those 
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serving life without parole. Most reasonable jurists agree that the imposition of the death penalty 
should trigger additional protections that are not afforded to other defendants. There is also an 
absence of caselaw which would support the argument that the extension of these protections to 
death-row inmates violates the Equal Protection Clause by not affording the same safeguards to 
non-death-row inmates. The same reasoning applies here. Where life without parole for a juvenile 
is tantamount to death, those defendants serving that sentence are afforded the additional 
protection. This is because they are simply in a different class. 
CONCLUSION 
After considering the law and arguments, the State requests that the Court grant the State's 
request and enter an order DISMISSING Defendant's Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence. 
DATED this {3 day of October, 2017. 
STATE'S REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION -4 
Michael F. Winchester, Esq. 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ___J_L day of October, 2017, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing was delivered to the following person(s) by: 
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Craig H. Durham, Esq. 
FERGUSON DURHAM, PLLC 
223 North 6th Street, Suite 325 
Boise, ID 83701 
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STATE OF IDAHO, 
v. 
Plaintiff, 
Case No, CR-95-502 
STIPULATION TO ALLOW 
DEFENDANT TO APPEAR AT 
HEARING BY TELF.,PHONF. 
CHRISTOPHER T. SHANAHAN, 
D~fondant, 
COME NOW the parties in this matter, by and through counsel, and stipulate to 
~n order allowing the Oele1,dant, Christopher Shanahan, to appear at the hearing set for 
November 201 2017, at 3:30 p.m. by tek>phon~ from the Idaho State Correctional Center. 
DATED: November 13, 2017 
Craig H. Durham 
Attomey for Chri.11topher Shanahan. 
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I hereby certify that on this_ 14th day of November, 2017, I served a copy of this 
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Mr. Paul Butikofer 
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PO Box 77 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON 
STATE OP IDAIIO, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
CIIRISTOPIIER T. SIIANAIIAN, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CR-95-502 
ORDER ALLOWING 
DEFENDANT TO APPEAR AT 
HEARING BY TELEPHONE 
GOOD CAUSE appearing, it is ordered that the Defendant, Christopher 
Shanahan, may appear at the hearing set for November 20, 2017, at 3:30 p.m. by 
telephone from the Idaho State Correctional Center. Mr. Shanahan can be reached at 
ISCC at 208-331-2760 ext. 20918. 
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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I hereby certify that on this \~ of November, 2017, I served a copy of this 
Stipulation on the following: 
Ms. Janel Borghero 
Email: jborgher@idoc.idaho.gov 
Scheduling Assistant, Idaho State Correctional Center 
Mr. Paul Butikofer 
Jefferson County Prosecuting Attorney 
PO Box 77 
Rigby ID 83442 
F: 208-745-7432 
Attorney for the State 
Mr. Craig II Durham 
FERGUSON OURI 1AM 
223 N. 6th Street, Suite 325 
Boise ID 83702 
F: 208-806-9663 
Email: chd@fergusondurham.com 
Attorney for the Defendant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff 
vs 
CHRISTOPHER T. SHANAHAN, 
Defendant 
Case No. CR-1995-0502 
MINUTE ENTRY RE: 
Motion to Reduce Sentence 
This matter came on for hearing on November 20, 2017, on motion to reduce sentence, at 
3:45 P.M. in Courtroom #3, before the Honorable Alan C. Stephens, District Judge, sitting in 
open court at Rigby, Idaho. 
The Court Reporter, Mary Ann Elliott, was present. 
Kylee Wetherell, Deputy Court Clerk, was present. 
Michael Winchester appeared on behalf of the State. 
Craig Durham appeared on behalf of the Defendant 
3:45 Off the record in order to attempt contact again with IDOC 
3:51 Back on the record 
Mr. Durham addressed the Court and presented argument 
3:57 Mr. Shanahan appeared via telephone from IDOC 
4:02 Mr. Winchester addressed the Court and made argument and asked that the Court deny 
the motion to reduce sentence 
Mr. Durham responded 
The Court addressed all parties and explained it would take the matter under advisement 
4:09 Court was thus adjourned 
c: Paul Butikofer, Esq. 
Craig Durham, Esq. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF'Til)t·' t 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON 
STA TE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
CHRISTOPHER T. SHANAHAN, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CR-1995-502 
DECISION AND ORDER RE: 
MOTION TO CORRECT ILLEGAL 
SENTENCE 
This is a motion to correct what Defendant claims is now an illegal sentence. Defendant 
pled guilty in 1995 to first-degree murder and robbery charges for killing a convenience store 
clerk while robbing the store. Defendant was 15 years old at the time he committed the crime. 
Defendant was sentenced to concurrent unified life sentences with ten years fixed for the robbery 
and 35 years fixed for the murder. Defendant is not currently eligible for parole and will not be 
eligible for parole under his current sentence until he is 50. Defendant has filed this motion 
claiming that recent precedent from the United States Supreme Court governing interpretation of 
the Eighth Amendment as applied to sentencing of minors has made his sentence illegal because 
at the time he was sentenced his youth was not taken into consideration as a potential mitigating 
factor. 
The court held a hearing on Defendant's motion on November 2, 2017 and has 
considered the motions, affidavits, declarations, and memoranda submitted by both parties. IT IS 
HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion is DENIED. 
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I. ST AND ARD OF REVIEW 
Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence 
Rule 35 of the Idaho Criminal Rules states: 
-
Within 120 days of the entry of the judgment imposing sentence or order releasing 
retained jurisdiction, a motion may be filed to correct or reduce a sentence and the court 
may correct or reduce the sentence. The court may also reduce a sentence on revocation 
of probation or on motion made within 14 days after the filing of the order revoking 
probation. Motions are considered and determined by the court without additional 
testimony and without oral argument, unless otherwise ordered. A defendant may only 
file one motion seeking a reduction of sentence. IC. R. 35(b ). 
Although the court is not required to hear additional testimony or argument on a Rule 35 
motion, a defendant must provide new or additional information in support of the motion 
showing that the sentence is excessive. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201 , 203 (2007). A district 
court 's decision on a Rule 35 motion is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Id. 
II. ANALYSIS 
Miller Requirements 
In 2012, the United States Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 
(2012), which prohibited sentencing guidelines that mandated a sentence of life imprisonment 
without parole for any crime committed by someone under the age of 18. The Supreme Court 
had previously ruled that the death penalty was unconstitutional for minors in Roper v. Simmons, 
543 U.S. 551 (2005), and ruled that life imprisonment without parole was unconstitutional for 
minors who committed non-homicide crimes in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010). The 
Court in Miller noted that the precedent set by Graham and Roper established that "children are 
constitutionally different from adults for the purposes of sentencing." Miller, 567 U.S. at 471. 
The Court's reasoning rested on three grounds: the recognition that children have a lack of 
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maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility, that children are more "vulnerable ... to 
negative influences and outside pressures," including the fact that they cannot escape negative 
environments as easily as adults can, and that a child's character is not as "well formed" as an 
adult's character, meaning that a child is more likely to change and a crime is less likely to be 
evidence of"irretrievable depravity." Id., citing Graham, 560 U.S. at 68; Roper, 543 U.S. at 
569. 
Even though Graham only dealt with a non-homicide crime and Roper dealt with the 
death penalty, the Supreme Court reasoned that the same qualities of youth that made the death 
penalty and life imprisonment without parole for non-homicide crimes inappropriate for 
juveniles also applied to homicide cases. The court stated that "none of what it [Graham] said 
about children-about their distinctive (and transitory) mental traits and environmental 
vulnerabilities-is crime-specific. Those features are evident in the same way, and to the same 
degree, when (as in both cases here) a botched robbery turns into a killing." Miller, 567 U.S. at 
473. 
Miller also emphasized that the penological justifications for harsh sentencing are 
weakened because of an offender's youth- retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation, and 
incapacitation are all less effective, according to the Supreme Court, because of the "distinctive 
attributes of youth." Id. at 4 72. Basing its reasoning on Roper and Graham, the Court held that 
"the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without 
possibility of parole for juvenile offenders ... Although we do not foreclose a sentencer's ability to 
make that judgment in homicide cases, we require it to take into account how children are 
different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in 
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prison." Miller, 567 U.S. at 479. The Supreme Court did not entirely ban the possibility of 
sentencing a juvenile to life without parole, but did state that: 
Given all we have said in Roper, Graham, and this decision about children's diminished 
culpability and heightened capacity for change, we think appropriate occasions for 
sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty will be uncommon ... especially so 
because of the great difficulty we noted in Roper and Graham of distinguishing at this 
early age between "the juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient 
immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption." 
Id. at 479-80; citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 573. 
Given this language and conclusion, the Supreme Court clearly intended to minimize the number 
of life sentences without parole given to juvenile offenders, even if it declined to bar the sentence 
outright. 
Montgomery 
In 2016, the Supreme Court made Miller both binding on the states and retroactive in 
application in Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S.Ct. 718 (2016). In that case, the Supreme Court 
heard the case of a petitioner who had been sentenced to life in prison for a murder committed 
decades before Miller was decided. The Supreme Court held that "Miller announced a 
substantive rule of constitutional law .. . Miller's conclusion that the sentence of life without 
parole is disproportionate for the vast majority of juvenile offenders raises a grave risk that many 
are being held in violation of the Constitution." Montgomery, 136 S.Ct. at 736. The correct 
procedure for implementing Miller should be, under Montgomery, "a hearing where "youth and 
its attendant characteristics·• are considered as sentencing factors is necessary to separate those 
juveniles who may be sentenced to life without parole from those who may not." Montgomery, 
136 S.Ct. at 735, citing Miller, 567 U.S. at 460. The Montgomery court acknowledged that 
Miller did not require a "finding of fact regarding a child's incorrigibility," 
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However, the Court held that "giving Miller retroactive effect, moreover, does not require 
States to re litigate sentences, let alone convictions, in every case where a juvenile offender 
received mandatory life without parole. A State may remedy a Miller violation by permitting 
juvenile homicide offenders to be considered for parole, rather than by resentencing them." 
Montgomery, 136 S.Ct. at 736. The rationale behind this holding was to ensure that 'juveniles 
whose crimes reflected only transient immaturity-and who have since matured-will not be 
forced to serve a disproportionate sentence in violation of the Eighth Amendment." Id. The 
Court also stated that this requirement would not be an "onerous burden" on the states, nor 
would it "disturb the finality of state convictions," since prisoners who had not reformed could 
simply remain in prison while those who had could be given parole eligibility instead of a full re-
sentencing. Id. 
Idaho Case Law since Miller and Montgomery 
The primary Idaho case to have considered a situation similar to Defendant's since Miller 
and Montgomery were decided was Johnson v. State, 395 P.3d 1246 (Idaho 2017). That case 
concerned a juvenile who was sentenced to life in prison without parole for the murder of her 
parents. After Miller and Montgomery were decided, she filed a motion to correct her sentence, 
stating that it was illegal under those cases. Part of her reasoning was based on the fact that the 
trial court had made no finding that the defendant was "irreparably corrupt," and part of her 
reasoning was based on the argument that the district court did not adequately consider 
mitigation arguments based on her youth. Johnson, 395 P.3d at 1258. The court dismissed the 
first argument as being contrary to Montgomery (which acknowledged that Miller did not impose 
a fact-finding requirement), but did affirm that "the requirement to hold such a hearing "gives 
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effect to Miller's substantive holding that life without parole is an excessive sentence for children 
whose crimes reflect transient immaturity." Johnson, 395 P.3d at 1258; citing Montgomery, 136 
S.Ct. at 735. The court held that even though the defendant's sentencing hearing had been held 
before Miller and Montgomery were decided, the trial court had properly heard testimony about 
and taken into account the defendant's youth and psychological immaturity, and had properly 
taken such testimony into account in sentencing the defendant to life in prison without parole. 
Johnson, 395 P.3d at 1259. Therefore, the defendant's sentence did not violate Miller, because 
the trial court had properly considered such factors when sentencing the defendant. 
In State v. Jensen, 385 P.3d 5 (Ct. App Idaho 2016) the Idaho Court of Appeals 
considered a defendant's challenge to the automatic sentencing statute found in Idaho Code§ 20-
509, which provides that juveniles who commit certain enumerated crimes are automatically 
charged and sentenced as adults. This case did not involve a life sentence without the possibility 
of parole, but the defendant argued that failure to take his youth into consideration violated 
Miller. Jensen, 385 P.3d at 8. The Court of Appeals, however, held that LC. §20-509 was 
merely a procedural statute and did not implicate the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 9. The court 
stated that "being waived into adult court, whether mandatory or discretionary, is not a 
punishment. The Eighth Amendment only comes into play after a formal adjudication of guilt 
and therefore, does not apply." The court went on further to note that the statute permitted courts 
to sentence in accordance with adult sentencing measures, juvenile sentencing measures, or both. 
Id. Even though the Court of Appeals acknowledged that the norm may be adult sentencing, 
"youthful characteristics" may be considered at sentencing to avoid Eighth Amendment 
concerns. Id. 
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Miller and Montgomery as Applied to Defendant's Case 
Defendant in this case argues that Miller applies because of Defendant's youth and 
immaturity at the time of the crime. It is not clear, however, that Miller is applicable to 
Defendant's case. Miller dealt exclusively with juveniles who were sentenced to life without 
parole for homicide killings. Montgomery also dealt with such a defendant, as did Johnson in 
Idaho. In this case, however, Defendant did not receive a sentence of life without parole. 
Defendant acknowledges this, and cites to other jurisdictions which have applied Miller to 
sentences which are the "functional equivalent" of life sentences. Some of these cases are more 
persuasive than others (State v. Houston-Sconiers, 391 P.3d 409 (Wash. 2017), cited in 
Defendant's memo, involved non-homicide crimes, which are more appropriately handled under 
Graham than Miller, since Miller still permits life without parole for some circumstances 
involving homicide crimes), but none are directly controlling under Idaho law. 
Much of Defendant's argument in paragraph C concerning Defendant's trial as an adult is 
foreclosed by Jensen. Only the actual sentencing is relevant for the purposes of an Eighth 
Amendment analysis, the procedure is not as it does not impose a sentence. Therefore, this 
cannot be taken into consideration in determining whether Defendant received an adequate 
hearing. 
Defendant is correct that even though Defendant was lawfully prosecuted as an adult, 
Defendant was ineligible for the death penalty under Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 
(1988). Therefore, although testimony was presented concerning Defendant's youth and mental 
health, to the extent that this testimony went to mitigating the death penalty it was inappropriate, 
since Defendant was completely ineligible for the death penalty. However, the fact remains that 
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this testimony was presented, and there is precedent in Johnson that a hearing specifically 
invoking Miller is not necessary so long as the testimony concerns the same issues and 
mitigating factors that Miller identified. Johnson, 395 P.3d at 1259 
("Although Miller and Montgomery had not been decided at the time of the sentencing hearing, 
and therefore the terms of "irreparably corrupt" and "transient immaturity" were not in the 
court's lexicon at that time, the court clearly considered Johnson's youth and all its attendant 
characteristics and determined, in light of the heinous nature of the crime, that Johnson, despite 
her youth, deserved life without parole.") Johnson also held in agreement with Montgomery 
that a finding of "permanent incorrigibility" is not required, further refuting a portion of 
Defendant's argument. Id. at 1258. 
Ultimately, the issue with Defendant's argument is that Defendant did receive a sentence 
of life with the possibility of parole as opposed to life without parole. It is true that other 
jurisdictions have held long terms of parole ineligibility to be subject to Miller, especially in light 
of the fact that Miller acknowledged that life in prison was a harsher punishment for a juvenile 
than an adult offender. Miller, 567 U.S. at 475. However, in light of the precedent in Johnson, 
where some testimony of Defendant's age and mental health was presented at the mitigation 
hearing, Defendant's situation is not exactly the same as the situation in Miller. Defendant 
cannot say that no testimony of his age was presented or heard. Because the sentencing court 
heard testimony regarding Defendant's age and mental health, this Court must deny Defendant's 
motion. 
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III. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, Defendant's Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence is DENIED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this ~ &'~ay of November, 2017. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 1-~ of November, 2017, I did send a true and correct 
copy of the forgoing document upon the parties listed below my mailing, with the correct 
postage thereon; by causing the same to be placed in the respective courthouse mailbox; or by 
cause the same to be had delivered. 
Paul G. Butikofer 
Michael F. Winchester 
Weston S. Davis 
OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
JEFFERSON COUNTY 
143 N. State Street Ste. 1 
Rigby, ID 83442 
P.O. Box 77 
Telephone: 208-745-5888 
Facsimile: 208-745-7342 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Craig H. Durham 
FERGUSON DURHAM, PLLC 
223 N. 6th Street, Suite 325 
Boise, ID 83702 
Telephone: 208-345-5183, ext. 1000 
Facsimile: 208-906-8663 
Attorney for Defendant 
BY~._..__) __ _ 
Jefferson County Clerk 
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Craig H. Durham 
ISB No. 6428 
-
FERGUSON DURHAM, PLLC 
223 N. 6th Street, Suite 325 
Boise, ID 83701 
chd@fergusondurham.com 
T: 208-345-5183, ext. 1000 
F: 208-906-8663 
Attorney for Defendant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plain tiff-Respondent, Case No. CR-95-502 
v. NOTICE OF APPEAL 
CHRISTOPHER T. SHANAHAN, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. Christopher Shanahan, the above named-appellant, appeals against the 
above-named plaintiff-respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the District Court's 
Decision and Order Re: Defendant's Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence, entered in the 
above entitled action on the 28th day of November, 2017, the Honorable Judge Alan 
Stephens, presiding. A copy of the order being appealed is attached to this notice. 
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2. That appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the 
order described in<_[ 1 is appealable order made after judgment under Rule ll(a)(7) of 
the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
3. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal: 
(a) The District Court erred in denying Mr. Shanahan's Motion to 
Correct an Illegal Sentence. 
4. To appellant's knowledge, there is no order entered sealing all or any 
portion of the record. 
5. Appellant requests that a transcript be prepared of: 
(a) The November 20, 2017 Motions Hearing. 
Mary Ann Elliott, court reporter. 
6. The appellant requests the following documents to be included in the 
clerk's record: 
(a) Defendant's Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence, filed on June 30, 
2017, including Exhibits A-I; 
(b) Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Correct an 
Illegal Sentence, filed on June 30, 2017; 
( c) The State's Objection to Motion to Correct an 
Illegal Sentence and Motion to Dismiss, filed August 24, 2017; 
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(d) Defendant's Response to State's Objection and Motion to Dismiss, 
filed September 23, 2017. 
(e) The State's Reply to Defendant's Response, filed October 13, 2017. 
7. Exhibits: Appellant requests that the Exhibits A, including Attachment 1 
to Exhibit A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, and I, submitted with his Motion to Correct an Illegal 
Sentence be added to the Clerk's Record and submitted to the Idaho Supreme Court. 
8. I certify: 
(a) That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter of 
whom a transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out below: 
Name and address: Mary Ann Elliott 
210 Courthouse Way, Suite 120 
Rigby Idaho 83442 
(b) That the clerk of the district court has been paid the estimated fee for 
preparation of the reporter's transcript. 
(c) That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid. 
(d) That the appellate filing fee has been paid. 
(e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant 
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A ttomey for Christopher Shanahan 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 22nd day of December, 2017, I served a copy of this 
Notice of Appeal on the following, by depositing a copy, postage prepaid, in the United 
States Mail, addressed to: 
Clerk of the District Court 
Jefferson County Courthouse 
210 Courthouse Way, Suite 100 
Rigby Idaho 83442 
Mr. Paul Butikofer 
Jefferson County Prosecuting Attorney 
PO Box 77 
Rigby ID 83442 
Attorney General of Idaho 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
Clerk of the Supreme Court 
POBox83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0101 
Mary Ann Elliott 
Court Reporter 
210 Courthouse Way, Suite 120 
Rigby Idaho 83442 
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STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff~ 
vs. 
CHRISTOPHER T. SHANAHAN, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CR-1995-502 
DECISION AND ORDER RE: 
MOTION TO CORRECT ILLEGAL 
SENTENCE 
This is a motion to correct what Defendant claims is now an illegal sentence. Defendant 
pied guilty in 1995 to first-degree murder and robbery charges for killing a convenience store 
clerk while robbing the store. Defendant was 15 years old at the time he committed the crime. 
Defendant was sentenced to concurrent unified life sentences with ten years fixed for the robbery 
and 35 years fixed for the murder. Defendant is not currently eligible for parole and will not be 
eligible for parole under his current sentence until he is 50. Defendant has filed this motion 
claiming that recent precedent from the United States Supreme Court governing interpretation of 
the Eighth Amendment as applied to sentencing of minors has made his sentence illegal because 
at the time he was sentenced his youth was not taken into consideration as a potential mitigating 
factor. 
The court held a hearing on Defendant's motion on November 2, 2017.and has 
considered the motions, affidavits, declarations, and memoranda submitted by both parties. IT IS _____ ., ____ _ 
HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion is DENIED. 
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I. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence 
Rule 35 of the Idaho Criminal Rules states: 
-
Within 120 days of the entry of the judgment imposing sentence or order releasing 
retained jurisdiction, a motion may be filed to correct or reduce a sentence and the court 
may coJTeCt or reduce the sentence. The court may also reduce a sentence on revocation 
of probation or on motion made within 14 days after the filing of the order revoking 
probation. Motions are considered and detennined by the court without additional 
testimony and without oral argument. unless otherwise ordered. A defendant may only 
file one motion seeking a reduction of sentence. L C.R. 35(b ). 
Although the court is not required to hear additional testimony or argument on a Rule 35 
motion, a defendant must provide new or additional information in support of the motion 
showing that the sentence is excessive. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201,203 (2007). A district 
court's decision on a Rule 35 motion is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Id. 
Il. ANALYSIS 
Miller Requirements 
In 2012, the United States Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama, 561 U.S. 460 
(2012), which prohibited sentencing guidelines that mandated a sentence oflife imprisonment 
without parole for any crime committed by someone under the age of l 8. The Supreme Court 
had previously ruled that the death penalty was unconstitutional for minors in Roper v. Simmons, 
543 U.S. 551 (2005), and ruled that life imprisonment without parole was unconstitutional for 
minors who committed non-homicide crimes in Graham v. Florida. 560 U.S. 48 (2010). The 
Court in Miller noted that the precedent set by Graham and Roper established that "children are 
constitutionall:r different from adults for the pwposes of sentencing." Miller. 567 U.S. at 471. 
-The-Court! s-reasoning-rested on three grounds: the-recognition that children-have-a-lack of· --------- ·- - --- -
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maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility, that children are more "vulnerable ... to 
negative influences and outside pressures," including the fact that they cannot escape negative 
environments as easily as adults can, and that a child's character is not as "well formed,, as an 
adult's character, meaning that a child is more likely to change and a crime is less likely to be 
evidence of"irretrievable depravity." Id., citing Graham, 560 U.S. at 68; Roper, 543 U.S. at 
569. 
Even though Graham only dealt with a non-homicide crime and Roper dealt with the 
death penalty, the Supreme Court reasoned that the same qualities of youth that made the death 
penalty and life imprisonment without parole for non-homicide crimes inappropriate for 
juveniles also applied to homicide cases. The court stated that ''none of what it [Graham] said 
about children-about their distinctive (and transitory) mental traits and environmental 
vulnerabilities-is crime-specific. Those features are evident in the same way, and to the same 
degree, when (as in both cases here) a botched robbery turns into a killing!' Miller, S61 U.S. at 
473. 
Miller also emphasized that the penological justifications for harsh sentencing are 
weakened because of an offender's youth - retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation, and 
incapacitation are all less effective, according to the Supreme Court, because of the "~stinctive 
attributes of youth.,, Id. at 4 72. Basing its reasoning on Roper and Graham, the Court held that 
"the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without 
possibility of parole for juvenile offenders ... Although we do not foreclose a sentencer's ability to 
make that judgment in homicide cases. we require it to take into account how children are 
-~---different,-and -how those differences ·counsel against irrevocably sentencmgtllemto a lifetime in- -- -- ----~ ·--
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prison." Miller, 567 U.S. at 479. The Supreme Court did not entirely ban the possibility of 
sentencing a juvenile to life without parole, but did state that: 
Given all we have said in Roper, Graham, and this decision about children's diminished 
culpability and heightened capacity for change, we think appropriate occasions for 
sentencingjuveniles to this harshest possible penalty will be uncommon ... especially so 
because of the great difficulty we noted in Roper and Graham of distinguishing at this 
early age between "the juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient 
immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption." 
Id -at 479-80; citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 573. 
Given this language and conclusion, the Supreme Court clearly intended to minimize the number 
of life sentences without parole given to juvenile offenders, even ifit declined to bar the sentence 
outright. 
Montgomery 
In 2016, the Supreme Court made Miller both binding on the states and retroactive in 
application in Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S.Ct. 718 (2016). In that case, the Supreme Court 
heard the case of a petitioner who had been sentenced to life in prison for a murder committed 
decades before Miller was decided. The Supreme Court held that "Miller announced a 
substantive rule of constitutional law .. . Miller's conclusion that the sentence of life without 
parole is disproportionate for the vast majority of juvenile offenders raises a grave risk that many 
are being held in violation of the Constitution." Montgomery, 136 S.Ct. at 736. The correct 
procedure for implementing Miller should be, under Montgomery, "a hearing where "youth and 
its attendant characteristics" are considered as sentencing factors is necessary to separate those 
juveniles who may be sentenced to life without parole from those who may not." Montgomery, 
136 S.Ct. at 735, citing Miller, 567 U.S. at 460. The Montgomery court acknowledged that 
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However. the Court held that "giving Miller retroactive effect, moreover, does not require 
States to relitigate sentences, let alone convictions, in every case where a juvenile offender 
received mandatory life without parole. A State may remedy a Miller violation by permitting 
juvenile homicide offenders to be considered for parole, rather than by resentencing them." 
Montgomery, 136 S.Ct. at 736. The rationale behind this holding was to ensure that 'juveniles 
whose crimes reflected only transient immaturity-and who have since matured-will not be 
forced to serve a disproportionate sentence in violation of the Eighth Amendment" Id. The 
Court also stated that this requirement would not be an "onerous burden" on the states, nor 
would it "disturb the finality of state convictions," since prisoners who had not reformed could 
simply remain in prison while those who had could be given parole eligibility instead of a full re-
sentencing. Id. 
Idaho Case Law since Miller and Montgomery 
The primary Idaho case to have considered a situation similar to Defendant's since Miller 
and Montgomery were decided was Johnson v. State, 395 P.3d 1246 (Idaho 2017). That case 
concerned a juvenile who was sentenced to life in prison without parole for the murder of her 
parents. After Miller and Montgomery were decided, she filed a motion to correct her sentence, 
stating that it was illegal under those cases. Part of her reasoning was based on the fact that the 
trial court had made no finding that the defendant was .. irreparably corrupt," and part of her 
reasoning was based on the argument that the district court did not adequately consider 
mitigation arguments based on her youth. Johnson, 395 P.3d at 1258. The court dismissed the 
first argument as being contrary to Monrgomery (which acknowledged that Miller did not impose 
------------a-fact-finding requirement);-but did affirm that ''the requirementto hold suchtrheating"gives --
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effect to Miller's substantive holding that life without parole is an excessive sentence for children 
whose crimes reflect transient immaturity." Johnson, 395 P.3d at 1258; citing Montgomery, 136 
S.Ct. at 735. The court held that even though the defendant's sentencing hearing had been held 
before Miller and Montgomery were decide~ the trial court had properly heard testimony about 
and taken into account the defendant's youth and psychological immaturity, and had properly 
taken such testimony into account in sentencing the defendant to life in prison without parole. 
Johnson, 395 P.3d at 1259. Therefore, the defendant's sentence did not violate Miller, because 
the trial court had properly considered such factors when sentencing the defendant 
In State v. Jensen, 385 P.3d 5 (Ct. App Idaho 2016) the Idaho Court of Appeals 
considered a defendant's challenge to the automatic sentencing statute found in Idaho Code§ 20-
509, which provides that juveniles who commit certain enumerated crimes are automatically 
charged and sentenced as adults. This case did not involve a life sentence without the possibility 
of parole, but the defendant argued that failme to take his youth into consideration violated 
Miller. Jensen, 385 P.3d at 8. The Court of Appeals, however, held that I.C. §20-509 was 
merely a procedural statute and did not implicate the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 9. The court 
stated that "being waived into adult court, whether mandatory or discretionary, is not a 
punishment The Eighth Amendment only comes into play after a formal adjudication of guilt 
and therefore, does not apply." The court went on further to note that the statute permitted courts 
to sentence in accordance with adult sentencing measures, juvenile sentencing measures, or both. 
Id. Even though the Court of Appeals acknowledged that the norm may be adult sentencing, 
''youthful characteristics" may be considered at sentencing to avoid Eighth Amendment 
- --concerns~- /d~-- - - ---- · 
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Miller and Montgomery as Applied to Defendant's Case 
Defendant in this case argues that Miller applies because of Defendant's youth and 
immaturity at the time of the crime. It is not clear, however, that Miller is applicable to 
Defendant's case. Miller dealt exclusively with juveniles who were sentenced to life without 
parole for homicide killings. Montgomery also dealt with such a defendant, as did Johnson in 
Idaho. In this case, however, Defendant did not receive a sentence of life without parole. 
Defendant acknowledges this, and cites to other jurisdictions which have applied Miller to 
sentences which are the "functional equivalent'' of life sentences. Some of these cases are more 
persuasive than others (State v. Houston-Sconiers, 391 P.3d 409 (Wash. 2017), cited in 
Defendant's memo, involved non-homicide crimes, which are more appropriately handled under 
Graham than Miller, since Miller still permits life without parole for some circumstances 
involving homicide crimes), but none are directly controlling under Idaho law. 
Much of Defendant's argument in paragraph C concerning Defendant's trial as an adult is 
foreclosed by Jensen. Only the actual sentencing is relevant for the purposes of an Eighth 
Amendment analysis, the procedure is not as it does not impose a sentence. Therefore, this 
cannot be taken into consideration in determining whether Defendant received an adequate 
hearing. 
Defendant is correct that even though Defendant was lawfully prosecuted as an adult, 
Defendant was ineligible for the death penalty under Thompson "· Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 
(1988). Therefore, although testimony was presented concerning Defendant's youth and mental 
health, to the extent that this testimony went to mitigating the death penalty it was inappropriate, 
since Defendant was completely ineligible for the death penalty. However, the fact remains that 
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this testimony was presented, and there is precedent in Johnson that a hearing specifically 
invoking Miller is not necessary so long as the testimony concerns the same issues and 
mitigating factors that Miller identified. Johnson, 395 P .3d at 1259 
(" Although Miller and Montgomery had not been decided at the time of the sentencing hearing, 
and therefore the terms of"irreparably coITUpt,, and "transient immaturity'' were not in the 
court's lexicon at that time, the court clearly considered Johnson's youth and all its attendant 
characteristics and detennined, in light of the heinous nature of the crime, that Johnson, despite 
her youth, deserved life without parole.") Johnson also held in agreement with Montgomery 
that a finding of "permanent inconigibility" is not required, further refuting a portion of 
Defendant's argument Id. at 1258. 
tntimately, the issue with Defendant's argument is that Defendant did receive a sentence 
of life with the possibility of parole as opposed to life without parole. It is true that other 
jurisdictions have held long terms of parole ineligibility to be subject to Miller, especially in light 
of the fact that Miller acknowledged that life in prison was a harsher punishment for a juvenile 
than an adult offender. Miller, 561 U.S. at 475. However, in light of the precedent in Johnson, 
where some testimony of Defendant's age and mental health was presented at the mitigation 
hearing, Defendant's situation is not exactly the same as the situation in Miller. Defendant 
cannot say that no testimony of his age was presented or heard. Because the sentencing court 
heard testimony regarding Defendant's age and mental health, this Court must deny Defendant's 
motion. 
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III. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, Defendant's Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence is DENIED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this )S'~ay of November, 2017. 
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